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Abstract
I study a bargaining game in which a seller makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is
privately informed about her valuation, and the seller privately observes her stochasti-
cally changing production cost. The seller’s time-varying private information gives rise
to new dynamics. Prices fall gradually at the early stages of negotiations, and trade
is inefficiently delayed. Inefficiencies persist even when gains from trade are common
knowledge. Privately observed costs lead to lower welfare, higher seller revenue and
lower buyer surplus (especially for high value buyers) relative to a setting with publicly
observed costs.
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1 Introduction
In many bargaining settings, new private information may arrive as negotiations proceed.
Consider, for instance, a producer of a new intermediate good negotiating a sale with a
potential industrial buyer. Since the good for sale is new, production costs are likely to be
initially high. Over time, costs may fall as the seller privately becomes more efficient. The
goal of this paper is to study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining
dynamics.
I study a bargaining game in which a seller makes offers to a privately informed buyer.1
The seller’s cost of producing the good (or, equivalently, the opportunity cost of selling it)
changes stochastically over time, and is privately observed by the seller. For simplicity, I
assume that the seller’s cost can take two values, high or low, and that it evolves over time as
a Markov chain. For most of the analysis, I focus on separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE), under which the seller’s price each period reveals her cost.2 These equilibria are
natural and tractable, and provide a natural point of comparison with prior papers in the
literature (e.g. Cho, 1990, Ortner, 2017).
The analysis delivers three main results. First, I provide a characterization of the set of
separating PBE. In any separating equilibrium, buyer and seller trade at a slow rate when
the seller’s cost is high, and prices fall gradually. When the seller’s cost falls, equilibrium
becomes Coasian: buyer and seller trade very fast at a low price. Market dynamics under
separating PBE are broadly consistent with dynamics typically observed in markets for new
durable goods, where prices fall gradually during the early stages, and market penetration
raises slowly (Conlon, 2012). Moreover, without loss, separating PBE can be taken to be
weakly stationary.
The key drivers of these equilibrium dynamics are the information revelation constraints
1As usual, this bargaining model is mathematically equivalent to a setting in which a durable good
monopolist sells to a population of heterogenous buyers.
2I also impose a natural restriction on off-path beliefs; see Section 2 for details.
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that arise as a result of the seller’s evolving private information. In any separating equilib-
rium, a seller whose cost just fell must not gain by mimicking a high cost seller and posting
a high price. The slow rate at which buyer and seller trade when costs are high makes this
deviation unprofitable, since a low cost seller has a stronger incentive to trade fast. An impli-
cation is that information revelation constraints lead to inefficiencies relative to the first-best
outcome. In contrast to other bargaining models with two-sided private information (e.g.
Cho, 1990), inefficiencies persist even when gains from trade are common knowledge.
The second main result studies the frequent-offers limit of (most efficient) separating
equilibria. I show that this limit is characterized by a system of differential equations, which
specifies how prices and probability of trade change over time while the seller’s cost is high.
This tractable characterization allows me to derive several comparative statics. An increase
in the seller’s high cost increases equilibrium prices, and lowers the speed with which buyer
and seller trade. An increase in the distribution of buyer values (in terms of reverse hazard
rate), or in the rate at which costs fall, have similar effects on bargaining dynamics. Lastly,
seller’s profits become negligible as the buyer’s lowest valuation converges to zero, as in
classic Coasian bargaining games (Fudenberg et al., 1985, Gul et al., 1985). The difference,
however, is that this fall in seller profits comes together with a drop in social welfare.
The third main result compares equilibrium outcomes in this model with a model in
which the evolution of the seller’s cost is publicly observed, as in Ortner (2017). Stationary
equilibria of the game with publicly changing costs retain several features of the Coasian
model. In the frequent-offers limit, the equilibrium outcome is efficient. Moreover, the seller
is unable to extract rents from high value buyers: her limiting profits are exactly what she
would earn if it was common knowledge that the buyer had the lowest possible value. This
contrasts sharply with the model with privately observed costs, in which trade is inefficiently
delayed, and the seller extracts rents. An implication is that privately observed costs lead to
lower social welfare, higher seller revenues and lower buyer surplus (especially for high value
buyers) relative to settings with public costs.
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Related literature. This paper fits into the literature on dynamic bargaining with private
information. Early contributions in this literature illustrate how, in settings with one-sided
private information, the uninformed party’s inability to commit to future offers severely
limits the rents she can extract (Bulow (1982), Fudenberg et al. (1985), Gul et al. (1985),
Gul and Sonnenschein (1988)). Stationary equilibria satisfy the Coase conjecture when offers
are frequent (Coase, 1972): the seller’s initial price is very low, and buyer and seller reach
an immediate agreement.
Several papers have identified economic forces that push towards inefficient bargaining
outcomes within the one-sided private information framework. Bargaining inefficiencies can
arise when bargainers strategically delay trade to signal their types (Admati and Perry,
1987), when players use non-stationary strategies (Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989), when
the seller faces capacity constraints (Kahn, 1986, McAfee and Wiseman, 2008), or when
values are interdependent (Evans, 1989, Vincent, 1989, Deneckere and Liang, 2006, Gerardi
and Maestri, 2017). Costly delays can also arise in the presence of deadlines (Gu¨th and
Ritzberger, 1998, Ho¨rner and Samuelson, 2011, Fuchs and Skrzypacz, 2013), when bargainers
have outside options (Board and Pycia, 2014), or when bargainers seek to build a reputation
for being tough (Myerson, 2013, Abreu and Gul, 2000).3
A smaller literature studies how delays and inefficiencies arise when there is two-sided
private information (Cramton, 1984, 1992, Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1987, 1988, Cho, 1990,
Ausubel and Deneckere, 1992). The current paper adds to this literature by analyzing a
model in which one of the bargaining sides receives new private information over time. The
analysis illustrates how such evolving private information affects bargaining outcomes, and
gives rise to new distortions and inefficiencies.4
3See also Abreu and Pearce (2007), Fanning (2016, 2018), Sanktjohanser (2017).
4For models with two-sided private information, the results in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show
that there is no budget balance mechanism that is individually rational, incentive compatible and efficient
(provided gains from trade are not common knowledge). An implication is that any PBE of such model must
necessarily be inefficient. In contrast, Appendix E provides conditions for the current model under which
efficiency can be achieved with a budget balance mechanism that satisfies IC and IR.
4
The current paper also relates to Ortner (2017), who studies a continuous-time durable
goods monopoly model in which the seller’s cost is publicly observed, and changes stochas-
tically over time.5 Ortner (2017) shows that time-varying costs allow the seller to extract
rents when buyer values are discrete. With a continuum of buyer types (as in the current
paper), the seller is unable to extract rents, and the market outcome is efficient. The results
for public costs in the current paper show that the conclusions in Ortner (2017) also hold in
the frequent-offers limit of discrete-time games.
Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) and Daley and Green (forthcoming) study bargaining games
with one-sided private information in which parties may receive public news while negoti-
ating. Their results shed light into how the arrival of public information affects bargaining
outcomes and can lead to costly delays and inefficiencies. In contrast, the current paper
highlights the inefficiencies generated by the arrival of new private information.
Hwang (2018) studies how the arrival of new private information affects trading dynamics
between a long-run seller and a sequence of short-term buyers. I instead study how new
private information affects bargaining dynamics between two long-run agents. Kennan (2001)
studies a repeated bargaining game with persistent one-sided private information, and shows
that this may give rise to path-dependent bargaining outcomes.
Lastly, several papers construct models to rationalize sales in durable goods markets.
Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1984, 1991) propose theories of sales driven by entry of
new consumers. Board (2008), Board and Skrzypacz (2016) and Dilme´ and Li (2019) show
that sales can be part of an optimal selling scheme when demand is time-varying. Dilme´
and Garrett (2017) show that sellers might extract additional rents by offering random price
discounts. The current paper adds to this literature by providing a theory of sales driven by
changes in the seller’s cost of production.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the solution con-
5See also Acharya and Ortner (2017), who study how public shocks affect equilibrium dynamics in
environments with persistent private information.
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cept. Section 3 characterizes the efficient outcome and the commitment solution. Section 4
characterizes the set of separating PBE. Section 5 studies the frequent-offers limit of welfare
maximizing separating PBE and derives several comparative statics. Section 6 compares
this model to a model in which the seller’s costs are publicly observed. Section 7 discusses
extensions and other equilibria. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Model
A seller with the technology to deliver a good faces a buyer. The buyer’s valuation for the
seller’s good, v, is her private information, and is drawn from distribution F with support
[v, v] and continuous density F ′ = f satisfying f(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [v, v]. I assume that
v > 0. Time is discrete, with t ∈ T (∆) = {0,∆, 2∆, ...,∞}.
The seller’s cost of delivering the good (or, equivalently, her opportunity cost of selling
it) changes over time. The seller’s cost can take two values: cH > 0 or cL = 0. At t = 0, the
seller’s cost c0 is cH with probability q ∈ (0, 1) and cL with probability 1− q. For all times
t ∈ T (∆), prob(ct+∆ = cH |ct = cH) = e−λ∆ with λ > 0, and prob(ct+∆ = cL|ct = cL) = 1.
The assumption that low cost cL is absorbing simplifies the exposition, but is not necessary;
Section 7 shows how the results generalize when cL is not absorbing. The seller is privately
informed about her production cost: she privately observes her current cost realization at
the start of each period t ∈ T (∆).
The timing of moves within each period t is as follows. At t = 0, the buyer privately
learns her valuation and the seller privately learns her initial cost. Then, the seller offers
price p0 ∈ R+, and the buyer chooses to accept or reject this price. At any time t > 0, if
the buyer hasn’t yet accepted a price, the seller first privately observes current cost ct. After
observing ct, the seller offers price pt ∈ R+, and the buyer chooses to accept or reject this
price. If the buyer accepts the seller’s offer at time t, trade happens and the game ends, with
the buyer obtaining payoff e−rt(v − pt) and the seller obtaining payoff e−rt(pt − ct), where
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r > 0 is the common discount rate.
Histories and strategies. At any period t before agreement is reached, the seller’s history
hSt = {cs, ps}s<t records all previous cost realizations and all previous prices, and the buyer’s
history hBt = {v, {ps}s<t} records her valuation and all previous prices. A (pure) strategy
for the seller σS : h
S
t × ct 7→ pt maps seller’s histories hSt and current cost ct into a price. A
(pure) strategy for the buyer σB : h
B
t × pt 7→ {accept, reject} maps buyer’s histories hBt and
the seller’s current price pt into a decision of whether or not to accept price pt.
Solution concept. For most of the paper, I focus on separating (weak) Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) under which, at every seller history, the seller’s price reveals her current
cost.6 Formally, let (σ, µ) be a PBE, where σ = (σS, σB) are the players’ strategies, and µ =
(µS, µB) are players’ beliefs: µS(h
S
t ) is the seller’s beliefs over the buyers’ type after history
hSt , and µB(h
B
t unionsq pt) the buyer’s beliefs over the seller’s cost at time t after history hBt unionsq pt.
I look for PBE (σ, µ) with the property that, for every seller history hSt , suppσ
B(hSt )(cH) ∩
suppσB(hSt )(cL) = ∅. That is, for every history hSt , the seller charges a different price if her
cost at time t is cH than if it is cL. As a result, for every on-path buyer history h
B
t unionsq pt,
µB(h
B
t unionsq pt) assigns probability 1 to either ct = cL or ct = cH .
I impose one additional restriction on the buyer’s beliefs: if at any history hBt the buyer
assigns probability 1 to the seller’s current cost being cL, then I require that for all histories
that follow hBt , the buyer continues to assign probability 1 to the seller’s cost being cL. This
restriction is natural, since cost cL is absorbing.
Let ΣS(∆) denote the set of PBE satisfying these conditions, under which the seller uses
a pure action while her costs are cH .
7
6Section 7 discusses other equilibria.
7In Appendix A, I briefly study equilibria in which the seller mixes while her cost are cH .
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Successive skimming. Any (weak) PBE must satisfy the skimming property : if at time
t a buyer with valuation v ∈ [v, v) finds it optimal to accept the current price pt, then a
buyer with valuation v′ > v also finds it optimal to accept pt. The reason for this is that it is
more costly for high-value buyers to delay trade.8 The skimming property implies that, for
any period t, there exists a cutoff κt+∆ such that a buyer with valuation v ≥ κt+∆ accepts
the current offer pt, and a buyer with valuation v < κt+∆ rejects the offer. Moreover, if the
buyer rejects all of the seller’s offers {ps}s≤t up to time t, the seller believes that the buyer’s
valuation is distributed according to prob(v ≤ vˆ) = F (vˆ)
F (κt+∆)
for all vˆ ∈ [v, κt+∆].
3 Benchmarks
This section derives two benchmarks: (i) the first-best outcome, and (ii) the seller’s optimal
commitment outcome.
First-best. Define ρ(∆) ≡ e−r∆(1−e−λ∆)
1−e−(r+λ)∆ to be the expected discounted time until costs fall
to cL, provided current cost is cH . Define v
∗(∆) to be the solution to:
v∗(∆)− cH = ρ(∆)v∗(∆).
Under the first-best outcome, the seller sells to a buyer with valuation v ≥ v∗(∆) at t = 0,
regardless of the initial cost, and sells to a buyer with valuation v < v∗(∆) the first time
costs fall to cL. Define τL ≡ min{t ∈ T (∆) : ct = cL} to be the random time at which costs
fall to cL. The following proposition summarizes the first-best outcome.
Proposition 1 (First best). Under the first-best, a buyer with valuation v ≥ v∗(∆) buys at
t = 0, and a buyer with valuation v < v∗(∆) buys at time τL.
Throughout the paper, I maintain the following assumption:
8See Lemma 1 in Fudenberg et al. (1985) for a formal proof.
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Assumption 1. v∗(∆) ∈ (v, v).
Commitment solution. Suppose next that the seller can commit to a mechanism at time
t = 0, after learning her initial cost c0. Let φ(v) ≡ v − 1−F (v)f(v) denote the buyer’s virtual
valuation. The following result holds.9
Proposition 2 (Commitment solution). Suppose φ(·) is strictly increasing. Then, under
the commitment solution, the seller sells to buyers with φ(v) ≥ v∗(∆) at t = 0, and to buyers
with φ(v) ∈ [0, v∗(∆)] at time τL. Buyers with φ(v) < 0 never buy.
As is standard in screening models, under the commitment solution the seller inefficiently
delays trade with lower value buyers to reduce the informational rents of higher value buyers.
These inefficiencies appear in two ways in Proposition 2. First, a buyer with value v ∈
[v∗(∆), φ−1(v∗(∆))] trades inefficiently late, at time τL. Second, a buyer with value v ∈
[v, φ−1(v∗(∆))] never trades.
4 Equilibrium
This section characterizes set ΣS(∆). I start with a few preliminary observations. Note
that in any PBE in ΣS(∆), when costs fall to cL the buyer’s beliefs about the seller’s cost
remain concentrated at cL at all future periods. Hence, the continuation game is strategically
equivalent to the one-sided incomplete information game in Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul
et al. (1985). This game has a unique equilibrium (since v > cL = 0), which is weakly
stationary: along the equilibrium path, the buyer’s purchasing decision depends on the
current price and the seller’s price offer depends on her current belief cutoff (see Fudenberg
et al. (1985) and Gul et al. (1985)).10
9The proof of Proposition 2 shows that the same result holds if the seller can commit prior to learning
her initial cost.
10Off the path of play, the seller’s price offer may also depend on the history of prices.
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For any κ ∈ [v, v], let pL(κ) denote the price that a seller posts in the one-sided incomplete
information game when her belief cutoff is κ, and let UL(κ) denote the seller’s equilibrium
continuation profits given belief cutoff κ.11
Consider next equilibrium behavior at periods at which costs are high. By the skimming
property, for any (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS(∆), on-path behavior at times t with ct = cH is characterized
by sequences {pHt , κHt }t∈T (∆) such that: pHt is the price that the seller charges at time t if
ct = cH , and κ
H
t is the seller’s belief cutoff at the start of time t if her cost last period was
cH . Therefore, along the equilibrium path, at any time t ∈ T (∆) with ct = cH , the buyer
accepts the seller’s price if her valuation lies in [κHt+∆, κ
H
t ); and the conditional probability
with which buyer and seller trade is
F (κHt )−F (κHt+∆)
F (κHt )
.
For any sequence {pHt , κHt }, and for all times s, let UHs ({pHt , κHt }) be the seller’s contin-
uation payoff if cs = cH , when play is given by {pHt , κHt }:
UHs ({pHt , κHt }) = (pHs − cH)
F (κHs )− F (κHs+∆)
F (κHs )
+ e−(r+λ)∆
F (κHs+∆)
F (κHs )
UHs+∆({pHt , κHt })
+ e−r∆(1− e−λ∆)F (κ
H
s+∆)
F (κHs )
UL(κHs+∆).
The following result holds.
Theorem 1. (i) Suppose sequences {pHτ , κHτ } are induced by an equilibrium (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS(∆).
Then, {κHτ } is decreasing, and for all t ∈ T (∆):
κHt+∆ − pHt = e−(r+λ)∆(κHt+∆ − pHt+∆) + e−r∆(1− e−λ∆)(κHt+∆ − pL(κHt+∆)), (1)
F (κHt )− F (κHt+∆)
F (κHt )
pHt ≤ UL(κHt )− e−r∆
F (κHt+∆)
F (κHt )
UL(κHt+∆), (2)
UHt ({pHτ , κHτ }) ≥ ρ(∆)UL(κHt ). (3)
(ii) There exists ∆ > 0 such that, if ∆ ≤ ∆, for any sequences {pHτ , κHτ } satisfying (1)-(3)
11If the seller randomizes her price in the one-sided private information game when her belief cutoff is κ,
I use pL(κ) to denote the expected price she charges.
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with {κHτ } decreasing, there exists an equilibrium (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS(∆) that induces {pHτ , κHτ }.
Theorem 1 emphasizes three properties of any equilibrium in ΣS(∆). First, by equation
(1), for all periods t with ct = cH the marginal buyer κ
H
t+∆ is indifferent between trading at
the current price pHt , or waiting and trading at time t+ ∆.
Second, by inequality (2), the probability (F (κHt ) − F (κHt+∆))/F (κHt ) with which buyer
and seller trade at a period t with ct = cH cannot be too large. As a result, equilibrium trade
is slow relative to the first-best outcome. To see why (2) holds, suppose that the seller’s
belief cutoff at t is κHt , and that her cost falls from cH to cL = 0 at this period. The seller’s
profit from posting price pL(κHt ) and revealing that her cost is U
L(κHt ). The seller’s profit
from mimicking a high cost seller for one period, and revealing her cost at t+ ∆, is
F (κHt )− F (κHt+∆)
F (κHt )
pHt + e
−r∆F (κ
H
t+∆)
F (κHt )
UL(κHt+∆).
Inequality (2) guarantees that this deviation is not profitable.
Third, equation (3) shows that the seller’s equilibrium payoff when her cost is cH must
be at least as large as what she would get by delaying trade until her cost falls to cL, and
playing the continuation equilibrium from that point onwards.
Proposition 3. Suppose sequences {pHτ , κHτ } are induced by an equilibrium (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS(∆).
Then, for all t ∈ T (∆), κHt ≥ v∗(∆).
Proposition 3 shows that any inefficiency takes the form of too much delay: since κHt ≥
v∗(∆) for all t, a buyer with value below cutoff v∗(∆) only trades when seller’s cost is cL.
Equilibrium existence. For all ∆ > 0, there always exist sequences {pHτ , κHτ } satisfying
the conditions in Theorem 1(i). For instance, sequences {pHτ , κHτ } with κHτ = v and pHτ = p
for all τ , with p satisfying
v − p = e−(r+λ)∆(v − p) + e−r∆(1− e−λ∆)(v − pL(v))
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satisfy (1)-(3). Hence, by Theorem 1(ii), ΣS(∆) is non-empty whenever ∆ is small enough.
Under this PBE, the seller posts a very high price while her costs are high, which all buyer
types reject. Buyer and seller only trade when seller’s costs fall to cL. Note, however, that the
game also admits more efficient equilibria, under which buyer and seller trade with positive
probability while ct = cH .
Stationary equilibria. Appendix A shows that, when looking for equilibria in ΣS(∆), it
is without loss to focus on equilibria that are weakly stationary. In particular, the arguments
in the proof of Theorem 1 imply that there exists ∆ > 0 such that, for all ∆ < ∆ and for any
(σ, µ) ∈ ΣS(∆), there exists a weakly stationary equilibrium (σs, µs) ∈ ΣS(∆) that induces
the same outcome as (σ, µ).
Welfare maximizing equilibria. In any equilibrium, the probability with which buyer
and seller trade while seller’s cost is high is bounded by inequality (2). This delayed trade
is socially costly. Therefore, under the most efficient equilibrium in ΣS(∆), constraint (2)
binds at (almost) all periods t with κHt > κ
H
t+∆.
5 Continuous-time limit
This section studies the frequent-offer limit of welfare maximizing equilibria. For each ∆ > 0,
let (σ∆, µ∆) be an equilibrium in ΣS(∆) achieving the largest social welfare (among equilibria
in ΣS(∆)). Let {pHt (∆), κHt (∆)} denote the prices and belief cutoffs induced by (σ∆, µ∆) at
periods at which the seller’s costs are cH .
Recall that, when the seller’s costs fall to cL, continuation play under any equilibrium
in ΣS(∆) is equivalent to the continuation equilibrium in a game with one-sided private
information. By Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul et al. (1985), as ∆ → 0, the seller’s price
converges to v (regardless of her belief cutoff), the buyer buys immediately at this price, and
the seller obtains profits v.
12
Define vˆ ≡ lim∆→0 v∗(∆) = r+λr cH . The following result holds.
Theorem 2. There exists functions pH : R+ → R and κH : R+ → [v, v] such that, for all
t ∈ T (∆), lim∆→0 pHt (∆) = pH(t) and lim∆→0 κHt (∆) = κH(t).
Functions pH(t) and κH(t) satisfy
−dp
H(t)
dt
= r(κH(t)− pH(t)) + λ(v − pH(t)), (4)
−dκ
H(t)
dt
=
F (κH(t))
f(κH(t))
rv
(pH(t)− v) , (5)
for all t ≤ tˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : κH(t) = vˆ}, with boundary conditions κH(0) = v and pH(tˆ) =
cH +
λ
r+λ
v. For all t > tˆ, dp
H(t)
dt
= dκ
H(t)
dt
= 0.
Theorem 2 shows that the limit of welfare maximizing equilibrium is characterized by a
system of differential equations. Equation (4) has the following interpretation. The buyer’s
benefit from delaying her purchase for an instant at time t while ct = cH is
−dp
H(t)
dt
+ λ(pH(t)− v).
Indeed, the seller’s price falls at rate dp
H(t)
dt
if costs remain high, and drops from pH(t) to v if
costs fall to cL. By equation (4), this benefit must equal the cost r(κ
H(t)− pH(t)) that the
marginal buyer type κH(t) incurs from delaying trade for an instant.
To see the intuition for (5), note that the equation can be written as
− dκ
H(t)
dt
f(κH(t))
F (κH(t))
(pH(t)− v) = rv. (6)
The left-hand side of equation (6) is the net benefit that a seller whose cost fell to cL = 0
at time t obtains from pretending that her cost is cH for an instant longer. The right-hand
side is the cost in terms of delayed trade that the seller incurs by following such a mimicking
strategy. The speed of trade −dκH(t)
dt
f(κH(t))
F (κH(t))
under a welfare maximizing equilibrium is the
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fastest speed such that the net gain from pretending to have a high cost is lower than the
cost of delayed trade.
Theorem 2 shows that, in the continuous-time limit, while costs are cH the seller trades
with the buyer until her belief cutoff reaches the efficient cutoff vˆ = r+λ
r
cH ; i.e., until time
tˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : κH(t) = vˆ}. Price pH(tˆ) at which a buyer with type vˆ trades leaves this buyer
indifferent between buying at tˆ, or waiting and buying at price v when costs fall to cL:
vˆ − pH(tˆ) = λ
r + λ
(vˆ − v)⇐⇒ pH(tˆ) = cH + λ
r + λ
v,
where the second equality uses vˆ = r+λ
r
cH .
The bargaining dynamics in Theorem 2 are broadly consistent with the dynamics typically
observed in markets for new durable goods. During the early stages of such markets, prices
typically fall gradually, but at a faster rate than costs, and market penetration raises slowly
(Conlon, 2012).
Relation to models with two-sided private information. Theorem 2 allows for a
comparison between the current model and separating stationary equilibria of models with
two-sided private information. Cho (1990) shows that, in such models, separating stationary
equilibria satisfy a version of the Coase conjecture: when gains from trade are common
knowledge (i.e., seller’s highest cost is lower than buyer’s lowest value), bargaining outcomes
are efficient, and the seller cannot extract rents from high value buyers.
In the current model, in contrast, bargaining inefficiencies persist even when gains from
trade are common knowledge. Indeed, information revelation constraint (2) (or (6) in the
continuous-time limit) bounds the rate at which buyer and seller trade while costs are high
even when gains from trade are common knowledge (i.e., cH < v).
De-coupling equation (4). The system of differential equations (4)-(5) in Theorem 2 is
coupled. I now show how to transform it to get a de-coupled ODE for prices.
14
For each κ ∈ [vˆ, v], let PH(κ) denote the price at which a buyer with value κ trades
when costs are cH in the continuous-time limit; that is, for all t ∈ [0, tˆ], PH(κH(t)) = pH(t).
Combining (4) and (5), and using dp
H(t)
dt
= dP
H(κH(t))
dκH
dκH(t)
dt
, PH(·) solves:
∀κ ∈ [vˆ, v], dP
H(κ)
dκ
=
(
r(κ− PH(κ)) + λ(v − PH(κ))) f(κ)
F (κ)
(PH(κ)− v)
rv
, (7)
with PH(vˆ) = cH +
λ
r+λ
v.
Comparative statics. I now use Theorem 2 to study properties of efficient equilibria and
derive several comparative statics. The first result shows how prices and speed of trade
change with changes in (i) cost cH , (ii) value distribution F , and (iii) speed λ at which costs
fall.
Proposition 4. The following comparative statics hold:
(i) as cH increases, price P
H(κ) increases for all κ > vˆ, and speed of trade −dκH(t)
dt
f(κH(t))
F (κH(t))
falls for all t < tˆ.
(ii) as F increases in terms of its reverse hazard rate, price PH(κ) increases for all κ > vˆ,
and speed of trade −dκH(t)
dt
f(κH(t))
F (κH(t))
falls for all t < tˆ.
(iii) as λ increases, price PH(κ) increases for all κ > vˆ close to vˆ, and speed of trade
−dκH(t)
dt
f(κH(t))
F (κH(t))
falls for all t close to tˆ.
The first part of Proposition 4 shows that the prices at which the different buyer types
trade when costs are high increase with an increase in cH .
12 Since prices are now higher, by
equation (6) the rate at which buyer and seller trade when costs are high must be adjusted
downwards to deter a low cost seller from pretending to have a high cost. The second part
12Although cost cH does not appear in the ODE (7), it does appear in the boundary condition P (vˆ) =
P
(
λ+r
r cH
)
= cH +
λ
r+λv.
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and third parts of Proposition 4 establish similar results for changes in the value distribution
and in the rate at which the seller’s cost falls.
The last result in this section studies equilibrium outcomes as the buyer’s lowest value v
becomes small. Recall that q = prob(c0 = cH).
Proposition 5. In the limit as v → 0,
(i) speed of trade −dκH(t)
dt
f(κH(t))
F (κH(t))
converges to zero for all t ≤ tˆ;
(ii) seller’s equilibrium profits converge to zero; and
(iii) total equilibrium surplus converges to (q λ
r+λ
+ 1− q)E[v].
Proposition 5 follows from equation (6): as v → 0, the speed at which buyer and seller
trade while costs are cH must converge to zero to deter a low cost seller from pretending to
have a high cost.
These results allow for further comparisons between the current model and previous
models in the literature. When the seller’s production cost is fixed and publicly known, the
seller’s profits converge to zero as the buyer’s lowest valuation v converges to zero (Fudenberg
et al., 1985, Gul et al., 1985). But the limiting equilibrium outcome is efficient: all buyers
trade immediately at price equal to marginal cost.
For models with two-sided private information and with time-invariant costs, the re-
sults in Cho (1990) imply that, in any separating stationary equilibrium, the seller’s profits
also converge to zero as the buyer’s lowest value converges to zero. However, inefficiencies
“explode” in this limit: only the seller with the lowest possible cost makes sales.13
Proposition 5 illustrates how these results generalize when the seller is privately informed
about her time-varying production cost. As in the two cases described above, the seller’s
profits go to zero as the buyer’s lowest value v goes to zero. Moreover, as in Cho (1990),
inefficiencies also grow in this “gapless” limit. The difference, however, is that seller and
buyer eventually trade with probability 1 in this model, when costs fall to cL.
13A related result is proved in Ausubel and Deneckere (1992), Theorem 1.
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6 Publicly observable costs
This section compares equilibrium outcomes described above with equilibrium outcomes of
a model in which the seller’s changing cost is publicly observable, as in Ortner (2017). Let
Σpub(∆) denote the set of weakly stationary PBE of the game with publicly observable costs;
i.e., PBE such that the buyer’s acceptance rule depends on her valuation and the seller’s
current cost, and such that, along the path of play, the seller’s price depends on her belief
cutoff and her current cost.14 Note that, in any (σ, µ) ∈ Σpub(∆), continuation play when
costs are cL is identical to continuation play in a model with one-sided private information.
In particular, as ∆ → 0, the seller’s price when costs are cL converges to v, and the buyer
accepts this price immediately.
For each ∆ > 0, let (σ∆, µ∆) ∈ Σpub(∆) be a weakly stationary equilibrium of the game
with public costs, and let Upub(σ∆, µ∆; ∆) denote the seller’s profits under (σ∆, µ∆) at t = 0,
conditional on her initial cost being cH . Recall that τL is the first time the seller’s cost falls
to cL. The following result holds.
Proposition 6. Suppose the seller’s costs are publicly observable. Then, as ∆→ 0:
(i) the equilibrium outcome under (σ∆, µ∆) converges to the first-best outcome;
(ii) if c0 = cH , the seller’s initial price under (σ
∆, µ∆) converges to cH +
λ
r+λ
v; and
(iii) if c0 = cH , seller’s profits U
pub(σ∆, µ∆; ∆) converge to λ
r+λ
v.
Proposition 6 generalizes the classic Coase conjecture (Coase, 1972, Fudenberg et al.,
1985, Gul et al., 1985) to settings in which production costs publicly change over time. As
the time period vanishes, the equilibrium outcome becomes efficient, and the seller is unable
to extract rents from high value buyers: her profits are exactly what she would obtain if the
buyer’s value was v with probability 1.15
14Existence of weakly stationary PBE can be proved by extending arguments in Gul et al. (1985).
15Indeed, if the buyer’s valuation was v with probability 1, the seller would optimally wait until time τL,
would charge price v at that point, and her expected profits would be λr+λv.
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Interestingly, even if the seller earns exactly what she would earn if the buyer had the
lowest value v, different types of buyers trade at different times, and at different prices: when
initial costs are cH , buyers with value above vˆ buy at time t = 0 at price cH +
λ
r+λ
v > v, and
buyers with value below vˆ buy at time τL at price v. However, the profit margin that the
seller makes on a high value buyer is exactly equal to the expected discounted profit margin
from selling to a low value buyer when costs fall to cL.
Proposition 6 contrasts sharply with the results in Theorems 1 and 2: the seller is able
to extract rents from high value buyers when she privately observes her cost, and the market
outcome is inefficient. Indeed, with privately observed costs, trade is inefficiently delayed
to satisfy the information revelation constraint in (2). As in the commitment solution in
Section 3, this inefficiently delayed trade reduces the rents of high value buyers, and allows
the seller to obtain larger profits.
Proposition 6, together with Theorems 1 and 2, imply that the buyer is worse-off when
the seller privately observes her evolving cost of production. However, this evolving pri-
vate information affects different buyer types differently: buyers with valuation above vˆ are
strictly worse-off when the seller privately observes her costs, whereas buyers with valuation
below vˆ are indifferent (since, in both cases, they trade at time τL at price v).
It is worth highlighting that the model with public costs cannot rationalize the price
dynamics typically observed in markets for new durable goods. In those markets, during the
early stages prices tend to fall at a faster pace than costs, leading to falling profit margins.
In contrast, Proposition 6 shows that prices fall in tandem with costs when costs are public,
and profit margins increase over time (from λ
r+λ
v when c = cH , to v when c = cL = 0).
Relation to Ortner (2017). Ortner (2017) studies a durable goods monopoly model in
which the seller’s costs are publicly observed and change stochastically over time. The key
results in that paper are: (i) time-varying costs allow the seller to extract rents when buyer
values are discrete; (ii) when there is a continuum of buyer types (as in the current model),
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the seller is unable to extract rents and the market outcome is efficient, as in Proposition 6.
The key difference is that Ortner (2017) casts the model directly in continuous time,
and introduces a new equilibrium notion to get around well-known difficulties in analyzing
continuous-time games with observable actions. Hence, Proposition 6 is a new result, which
shows that the conclusions in Ortner (2017) still hold in the continuous-time limit of discrete-
time games.16
7 Discussion
This section discusses: (i) conditions under which the model admits an efficient bargaining
mechanism; (ii) how the results extend when low cost cL is not absorbing, and (iii) other
types of equilibria.
An efficient mechanism. Appendix E shows that, under certain conditions, the frame-
work I study admits a mechanism that is budget balance, incentive compatible and individual
rational, and that implements the first-best outcome. This is true in spite of the fact that
both players have private information at the start of the game. Appendix E also shows that
the game does not admit an efficient equilibrium.
The direct mechanism that implements the first-best is as follows. When the seller reports
cost cL at t = 0, she sells to the buyer at price v regardless of the buyer’s reported value.
When the seller reports cost cH at t = 0, buyer and seller trade at t = 0 at price cH + ρ(∆)v
if the buyer reports a value higher than v∗(∆). If the buyer reports a value lower than v∗(∆),
she pays ρ(∆)v to the seller at t = 0. This payment gives the buyer the option to get the
seller’s good at price cL = 0 the first time t > 0 that the seller reports ct = cL. Proposition
E.1 in Appendix E shows that, when v(1−ρ(∆)) ≥ (1−F (v∗(∆))cH , this mechanism satisfies
IC, IR, and is budget balanced.
16Another difference is that, in Ortner (2017), the seller’s cost evolves as a geometric Brownian motion.
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The existence of an efficient mechanism satisfying IC, IR and budget balance distinguishes
the current model from prior bargaining games with two-sided asymmetric information. For
instance, the equilibria in Cho (1990) are inefficient only when the distribution of values
and the distribution of costs overlap. But we know from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
that such a framework does not admit an efficient mechanism satisfying IC, IR and budget
balance.
Increasing costs. The model assumes that cost cL is absorbing. This assumption greatly
simplifies the analysis and exposition. Indeed, it implies that in any equilibrium in ΣS(∆),
continuation play when the seller’s cost falls is equivalent to equilibrium play in a model
with one-sided private information.
In Appendix F, I study the case in which the cost evolution satisfies prob(ct+∆ = cH |ct =
cH) = e
−λ∆ and prob(ct+∆ = cL|ct = cL) = e−γ∆. I show that, in any weakly stationary
separating equilibrium, the seller’s continuation profits converge to v as ∆ → 0 whenever
her cost is cL. Indeed, when costs are cL, the Coasian incentive to accelerate trade constraints
the seller’s ability to extract rents from high value buyers.
Appendix F shows that, in this setting, prices still satisfy equation (1), with pL(κ) now
denoting the price that a low cost seller charges in a weakly stationary equilibrium. The
seller’s IC constraint now becomes:
F (κHt )− F (κHt+∆)
F (κHt )
pHt ≤ UL(κHt )− e−(r+γ)∆
F (κHt+∆)
F (κHt )
UL(κHt+∆)
− e−r∆(1− e−γ∆)F (κ
H
t+∆)
F (κHt )
UH(κHt+∆). (8)
The last term equation (8) above takes into account the possibility that the seller’s cost
increases next period if her current cost is cL, in which case the seller gets a continuation
profit UH(κHt+∆).
17
17Appendix F briefly shows how Theorem 2 extends to this environment.
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Other equilibria. Throughout the paper, I focused on separating equilibria, under which
the seller’s price each period perfectly reveals her current cost realization. Such equilibria
are intuitive, tractable, and help rationalize observed pricing dynamics in markets for new
durable goods. Moreover, such equilibria represent a natural point of comparison to prior
papers in the literature, like Cho (1990) and Ortner (2017)
However, the game admits many other equilibria. First, the game admits semi-separating
equilibria, in which a seller with ct = cH posts price p
H
t , and a seller whose cost fell to cL
posts price pHt with probability 1−αt and price pL(κHt ) with probability αt ∈ (0, 1).18 Under
such an equilibrium, equation (2) holds with equality at all periods t in which αt ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, under a semi-separating equilibrium the speed of trade is also slow relative to the
first-best. On the other hand, equation (1) becomes
κHt+∆ − pHt = e−r∆(µBt+∆e−λ∆ + (1− µBt+∆)αt+∆)(κHt+∆ − pHt+∆)
+ e−r∆(µBt+∆(1− e−λ∆) + (1− µBt+∆))(1− αt+∆)(κHt+∆ − pL(κHt+∆)), (9)
where µBτ is the probability that the buyer assigns to the seller’s cost being cH at the begin-
ning of period τ (i.e., before observing the seller’s price at time τ).
The game also admits pooling equilibria. For instance, the game admits equilibria in
which: (i) both types of sellers post the same price at times t = 0, ..., τ −∆; (ii) buyer and
seller play a continuation equilibrium in ΣS from τ onwards.
When q = prob(c0 = cH) is small, pooling equilibria are less efficient that separating
equilibrium. Indeed, when q ≈ 0, separating equilibria are approximately efficient in the
limit as ∆→ 0. However, since pooling equilibria don’t need to satisfy information revelation
constraint (2) during the pooling periods, when q is large there are pooling equilibria that
are more efficient than separating equilibria.
18Under such an equilibrium, once the seller posts price pL(κHt ), she reveals that her cost is cL, and the
continuation equilibrium is as in Gul et al. (1985), Fudenberg et al. (1985).
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Appendix
A Proofs of Theorem 1 and Proposition 3
In any PBE in ΣS, when costs falls to cL, continuation play coincides with equilibrium play
in the one-sided incomplete information game in Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul et al.
(1985).19 Hence, I focus on characterizing equilibrium behavior at periods t with ct = cH .
By the skimming property, any PBE in ΣS induces a decreasing sequence of belief cutoffs
{κHt } such that along the path of play, at any time t with ct = cH , (i) the seller believes that
the buyer’s type lies in [v, κHt ], and (ii) the buyer buys at time t if and only if her valuation
lies in [κHt+∆, κ
H
t ).
Lemma A.1. Fix a PBE (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS. Consider a seller history hSt with cs = cH for all
s < t such that the seller’s belief cutoff κt at time t is strictly larger than v. Let p
H
t be the
price that the seller charges under (σ, µ) at history hSt if ct = cH , and let κt+∆ be the highest
consumer type that buys at time t when ct = cH . Then, κt and κt+∆ satisfy
pHt
F (κt)− F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
≤ UL(κt)− e−r∆F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
UL(κt+∆). (10)
Proof. Consider a seller whose cost changed from cH to cL after history h
S
t . The profits that
this seller obtains by revealing her cost are UL(κt). The profits that this seller would make
by posting price pHt that she would have posted if ct = cH , and then from t + ∆ onwards
playing the continuation strategy with common knowledge cost cL and belief cutoff κt+∆ are
pHt
F (κt)−F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
+ e−r∆ F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
UL(κt+∆). A seller whose cost changed to cL at period t has
an incentive to reveal her cost only if (10) holds. 
Recall that ρ = e
−r∆(1−e−λ∆)
1−e−(r+λ)∆ . Fix a PBE in Σ
S, and consider a seller history hSt with
19For ease of exposition, throughout Appendix A I drop the dependence on time period ∆.
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cs = cH for all s < t leading to belief cutoff κ
H
t = κ. Note that at such a history, a seller with
cost ct = cH can obtain a payoff equal to ρU
L(κ) by posting prices above κ at all periods
until her costs fall to cL, and then playing her continuation strategy. Hence, the seller’s
continuation profits at this history under (σ, µ) cannot be lower than ρUL(κ).
Lemma A.2. Fix a PBE (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS, and consider a seller history hSt with belief cutoff κt.
If ct = cH , then κt+∆ ≥ min{κt, v∗}. In particular, if κt ≤ v∗ and ct = cH , the seller makes
a sale with probability zero at time t.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that ct = cH and κt+∆ < min{κt, v∗} ≤ v∗. Let
{κt+τ∆}∞τ=0 be a weakly decreasing sequence such that for all τ ≥ 0, if the seller’s cost
is cH at time t + τ∆, under (σ, µ) the seller sells to the buyer when her valuation is in
[κt+(τ+1)∆, κt+τ∆). Let {pHt+τ∆}∞τ=0 denote the sequence of prices that the seller charges at
each time t + τ∆ if ct+τ∆ = cH . Recall that p
L(κ) is the price that the seller charges if her
cutoff belief is κ and her costs are cL. By Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul et al. (1985),
pL(κ) is weakly increasing in κ.
Note first that, for all τ ≥ 0, it must be that
κt+(τ+1)∆ − pHt+τ∆ ≥ ρ(κt+(τ+1)∆ − pL(κt+(τ+1)∆)). (11)
Indeed, a buyer with value κt+(τ+1)∆ can guarantee a payoff of at least ρ(κt+(τ+1)∆−pL(κt+(τ+1)∆))
by delaying her purchase until the seller’s cost falls to cL. Note further that,
κt+(τ+1)∆ − cH < ρκt+(τ+1)∆,
where the inequality follows since κt+(τ+1)∆ ≤ κt+∆ < v∗ and since v∗−cH = ρv∗. Combining
this inequality with inequality (11),
pHt+τ∆ ≤ (1− ρ)κt+(τ+1)∆ + ρpL(κt+(τ+1)∆) < cH + ρpL(κt+(τ+1)∆) (12)
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Equation (12) implies that the profit margin pHt+τ∆− cH that the seller earns from selling to
consumers with value v ∈ [κt+(τ+1)∆, κt+τ∆) when her costs are cH is strictly lower than the
expected discounted profit margin ρpL(κt+(τ+1)∆) that the seller would earn if she waited
until her costs fell to cL = 0 and then charged price of p
L(κt+(τ+1)∆).
For all s ∈ T (∆), let UHs denote the seller’s on-path continuation payoff at time s if cs =
cH under equilibrium (σ, µ). For all κ ∈ [v, v], recall that UL(κ) is the seller’s continuation
payoff under (σ, µ) at a history with belief cutoff κ and at which her costs are cL, respectively.
I now use equation (12) to show that UHt < ρU
L(κt). This implies that (σ, µ) cannot be an
equilibrium, since at time t the seller can earn ρUL(κt) by waiting until her costs fall to cL
and then playing the continuation equilibrium from that point onwards.
Note that, for all τ ≥ 0,
UHt+τ∆ = (p
H
t+τ∆ − cH)
F (κt+τ∆)− F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
+ e−(r+λ)∆
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UHt+(τ+1)∆
+ e−r∆
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
(1− e−λ∆)UL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
< ρpL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)− F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
+ e−(r+λ)∆
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UHt+(τ+1)∆
+ e−r∆
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
(1− e−λ∆)UL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
= ρ
(
pL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)− F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
+
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
)
− e−(r+λ)∆ρF (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UL(κt+(τ+1)∆) + e
−(r+λ)∆F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UHt+(τ+1)∆ (13)
where the strict inequality follows from (12), and the last equality uses ρ = e−r∆(1−e−λ∆)+
e−(r+λ)∆ρ. Note next that, for all τ ≥ 0,
UL(κt+τ∆) ≥ pL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)− F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
+
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UL(κt+(τ+1)∆). (14)
Indeed, a seller with cost c = cL and with belief cutoff κt+τ∆ can earn the right-hand side of
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(14) by posting price pL(κt+(τ+1)∆). Combining (14) with (13), for all τ ≥ 0,
UHt+τ∆ < ρ
(
UL(κt+τ∆)− e−(r+λ)∆F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
)
+ e−(r+λ)∆
F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt+τ∆)
UHt+(τ+1)∆.
(15)
Using equation (15) repeatedly for all τ ≥ 0 yields
UHt <
∞∑
τ=0
e−(r+λ)τ∆ρ
(
F (κt+τ∆)
F (κt)
UL(κt+τ∆)− e−(r+λ)∆F (κt+(τ+1)∆)
F (κt)
UL(κt+(τ+1)∆)
)
= ρUL(κt).
But this cannot be, since a seller whose cost is cH at time t can obtain ρU
L(κt) by waiting
until her costs fall to cL = 0 and then playing her continuation strategy. 
For any equilibrium (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS, let
κ(σ,µ) = inf{κ ∈ [v, v] : ∃ on-path history (hSt unionsq cH) at which type κ buys under (σ, µ).}
Note that κ(σ,µ) is the lowest valuation at which the buyer buys when costs are cH under
equilibrium (σ, µ). By Lemma A.2, κ(σ,µ) ≥ v∗ for all (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS.
Fix a PBE (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS. Let {κHt } be the sequence of beliefs cutoffs induced by (σ, µ)
at histories at which the seller’s costs is cH . Under (σ, µ), a high cost seller stops selling
whenever her cutoff beliefs about the buyer’s valuation reach κ(σ,µ), so κHt ≥ κ(σ,µ) for all t.
Let tˆ denote the time at which a high cost seller sells to a buyer with valuation κ(σ,µ),
provided that tˆ is finite, and let κH
tˆ+∆
= κ(σ,µ). Note that, for all periods t ≥ tˆ + ∆ a high
cost seller does not make sales. Hence κHt = κ
H
tˆ+∆
for all t ≥ tˆ + ∆ (if tˆ is infinite, this is
vacuous).
Let {pHt }tˆt=0 be the prices that the seller charges at times t ≤ tˆ under (σ, µ) at histories
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at which her cost is high. For all t ≤ tˆ−∆, these prices satisfy:
κHt+∆ − pHt = e−(r+λ)∆(κHt+∆ − pHt+∆) + e−r∆(1− e−λ∆)(κHt+∆ − pL(κHt+∆)). (16)
Indeed, prices {pHt }tˆt=0 are such that a buyer with valuation κHt+∆ is indifferent between
buying at time t or waiting and buying at period t+ ∆.
For all κ ∈ [v, v], define pˆ(κ) ≡ κ(1 − ρ) + ρpL(κ). Price pˆ(κ) is such that a buyer with
valuation κ is indifferent between buying at pˆ(κ) when costs are cH and waiting until costs fall
to cL and buying at price p
L(κ). Note that pˆ(κ) is increasing in κ (since pL(κ) is increasing in
κ). Note further that, if tˆ is finite, it must be that pH
tˆ
= pˆ(κ(σ,µ)) = κ(σ,µ)(1−ρ)+ρpL(κ(σ,µ)).
If tˆ is finite, it is without loss to set pHt = p
H
tˆ
for all t ≥ tˆ+ ∆.
Given sequences {pHt , κHt }, for all times s let UHs ({pHt , κHt }) be continuation profits that
a seller obtains if cs = cH , when play is given by {pHt , κHt }:
UHs ({pHt , κHt }) = (pHs − cH)
F (κHs )− F (κHs+∆)
F (κHs )
+ e−(r+λ)∆
F (κHs+∆)
F (κHs )
UHs+∆({pHt , κHt })
+ e−r∆(1− e−λ∆)F (κ
H
s+∆)
F (κHs )
UL(κHs+∆).
If an equilibrium (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS induces sequences {pHt , κHt }, it must be that
∀s, UHs ({pHt , κHt }) ≥ ρUL(κHs ). (17)
Indeed, a seller whose cost is high by time s and whose belief cutoff is κHs can obtain a
payoff of ρUL(κHs ) by waiting until her costs fall to cL and then playing the continuation
equilibrium from that point onwards.
Proof of Theorem 1. The arguments above imply that conditions (1)-(3) must hold in
any PBE (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS.
I now turn to the proof of part (ii) of the Theorem. Fix sequences {pHτ , κHτ }, with {κHτ }
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decreasing, satisfying conditions (1)-(3). I now show show that there exists ∆ > 0 such that,
for all ∆ ≤ ∆, there exists a PBE (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS that induces {pHτ , κHτ }.
Let κ = limt→∞ κHt . For all κ ∈ [κ, v], let pH(κ) denote the price at which a buyer with
type κ buys under {pHt , κHt }. For all κ ∈ [v, κ), let pH(κ) = pL(κ), where pL(κ) is the price
that a buyer with type κ is willing to pay in the game with one-sided private information.
The buyer’s strategy under the proposed equilibrium (σ, µ) is as follows. For all histories
hBt unionsqpt with µB(hBt unionsqpt) = prob(ct = cH |hBt unionsqpt) = 1, a buyer with type κ buys iff pt ≤ pH(κ).
For all other histories, a buyer with type κ buys iff pt ≤ pL(κ).
Buyer’s beliefs under (σ, µ) are as follows. If at all periods s ≤ t the seller offered price
pHs , the buyer at time t believes that the seller’s cost is cH with probability 1. In any other
case, the buyer at time t believes that the seller’s cost is cL with probability 1.
The seller’s strategy is as follows. On the equilibrium path, for all t with ct = cH , she
charges price pHt . For all off-path histories h
S
t unionsqcH , the seller posts a price higher than v (and
no buyer type buys). For all t with ct = cL, the seller plays the continuation equilibrium of
the game with one-sided private information.20
Since {pHτ , κHτ } satisfies (16), optimal buyer behavior induces belief cutoffs {κHτ }, given
the seller’s strategy. Hence, the buyer’s strategy is sequentially rational at histories at which
she believes that the seller’s cost is high. Moreover, buyer’s strategy is sequentially rational
at histories at which she believes that the seller’s cost is low (since, at such histories, buyer
and seller are using the equilibrium strategy of the game with one-sided private information).
I now show that, for small enough ∆, the seller’s strategy is also sequentially rational.
Note first that, since {pHt , κHt } satisfy (10), the seller does not find it optimal to deviate at
a period t such that ct−1 = cH and ct = cL. Moreover, she doesn’t find it optimal to deviate
at a period t with ct−1 = cL and ct = cL (since, at such histories, buyer and seller are using
20Note that the strategy of the seller can be made weakly stationary. Indeed, by Fudenberg et al. (1985)
and Gul et al. (1985), the seller’s strategy is weakly stationary when ct = cL. Moreover, for all on-path
histories, while ct = cH the seller’s strategy can be written as p
H(κ) = pHt for all κ ∈ (κHt+∆, κHt ]; off path,
the seller charges price v.
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the equilibrium strategy of the game with one-sided private information).
By the Coase conjecture (Gul et al., 1985), for every η > 0 there exists ∆η > 0 such
that, for all ∆ ≤ ∆η, price pL(κ) that the seller charges when costs are c = cL = 0 is strictly
smaller than v + η for all κ. Pick η′ > 0 such that v + η′ − cH < ρv; since v < v∗ = cH1−ρ
(by Assumption 1), such an η′ exists. Let ∆ = ∆η′ , and suppose ∆ ≤ ∆. Note that if at a
period s with cs = cH the seller posts a price different from p
H
s , the highest profit she can
obtain is ρUL(κHs ).
21 Since {pHt , κHt } satisfies (17), the seller finds it optimal to post price
pHs . 
Proof of Proposition 3. Follows from Lemma A.2. 
Mixed strategy equilibria. Theorem 1 characterizes equilibria under which the seller
uses a pure action while her costs are cH .
The game also admits separating equilibria under which the seller mixes while her costs
are cH . In any such equilibrium, the (now random) sequence {pHt , κHt } must still satisfy (10),
(16) and (17). Indeed, Lemmas A.1 and A.2 apply to mixed strategy equilibria as well. And
inequality (17) must hold in any separating equilibrium, pure or mixed. In addition to these
conditions, if the seller mixes at some period t with ct = cH , she must be indifferent among
any price that she posts with positive probability.
Welfare maximizing equilibria. Let (σ, µ) be an equilibrium in ΣS that delivers the
largest social surplus (among all equilibria in ΣS). Under (σ, µ), constraint (10) is satisfied
for (almost) all times t. As a result, there exists a finite period tˆ at which, under (σ, µ), a
buyer with value κ(σ,µ) buys if ctˆ = cH ; (and so κ
H
tˆ+∆
= κ(σ,µ)).
21This follows since pL(κ) ∈ [v, v+η′] for all κ ∈ [v, v] whenever ∆ ≤ ∆, and since v+η′−cH < ρv. Hence,
the seller’s profit margin p − cH from any sale she makes while costs are high following such a deviation is
strictly smaller than ρv. Since pL(κ) ≥ v for all κ, the seller’s most profitable deviation is to wait until costs
fall to cL and then play the continuation equilibrium, obtaining a payoff of ρU
L(κHs ) ≥ ρv.
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Moreover, under (σ, µ), the price at which the seller sells at time tˆ if ctˆ = cH must be
equal to pˆ(κ(σ,µ)) = (1− ρ)κ(σ,µ) + ρpL(κ(σ,µ)). Indeed, after consumer κ(σ,µ) buys, buyer and
seller don’t trade until costs fall to cL. Price pˆ(κ
(σ,µ)) is the price that leaves consumer κ(σ,µ)
indifferent between buying at time tˆ with ctˆ = cH , or waiting until costs fall to cL and buying
at that point (at price pL(κ(σ,µ))).
B Proof of Theorem 2
For each ∆ > 0, let (σ∆, µ∆) be an equilibrium in ΣS(∆) achieving the largest social welfare.
Let {pHt (∆), κHt (∆)}t∈T (∆) denote the prices and belief cutoffs induced by (σ∆, µ∆) at periods
at which the seller’s costs are cH , and let κ
(σ∆,µ∆) be the lowest value buyer who trades while
costs are cH under (σ
∆, µ∆).
Lemma B.1. κ(σ
∆,µ∆) − v∗(∆)→ 0 as ∆→ 0.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose the result is false. Hence, there exists a sequence
{∆n} → 0 and an  > 0 such that limn→∞ κ(σ∆
n
,µ∆
n
) − v∗(∆n) > .
For each n, let tˆn be the time at which a buyer with value κn ≡ κ(σ∆
n
,µ∆
n
) buys under
(σ∆
n
, µ∆
n
) if ct = cH for all t ≤ tˆn. The price at which a buyer with value κn buys under
(σ∆
n
, µ∆
n
) when costs are cH is pˆ(κn) = (1− ρ(∆n))κn + ρ(∆n)pL(κn).
For each n, fix κˆn ∈ (v∗(∆n), κn) such that
pˆ(κˆn)
(
F (κn)− F (κˆn)
F (κn)
)
≤ UL(κn)− e−r∆nF (κˆn)
F (κn)
UL(κˆn).
Let {κ˜Ht (∆n)} be such that, for all t ≤ tn + ∆n, κ˜Ht (∆n) = κHt (∆n), (where {κHt (∆n)} is
the sequence of belief cutoffs under (σ∆
n
, µ∆
n
)) and for all t ≥ tˆ + 2∆n, κ˜Ht (∆n) = κˆn. Let
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{p˜Ht (∆n)} be such that p˜Ht (∆n) = pˆ(κˆn) for all t ≥ tn+∆n, and such that, for all t < tˆn+∆n,
κ˜Ht+∆n(∆
n)− p˜Ht (∆n) = e−(r+λ)∆
n
(κ˜Ht+∆n(∆
n)− p˜Ht+∆n(∆n))
+ e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κ˜Ht+∆n(∆n)− pL(κ˜Ht+∆n(∆n))). (18)
That is, {p˜Ht (∆n), κ˜Ht (∆n)} satisfies (16). Note that the inefficiencies under {p˜Ht (∆n), κ˜Ht (∆n)}
are smaller than under {pHt (∆n), κHt (∆n)}, since trade is delayed by less under the former.
The rest of the proof shows that, for n large enough, {p˜Ht (∆n), κ˜Ht (∆n)} can be supported
by an equilibrium in ΣS(∆n). This leads to a contradiction, since (σ∆
n
, µ∆
n
) was assumed
to be a welfare maximizing equilibrium in ΣS(∆n).
As a first step, I show that p˜Ht < p
H
t for all t ≤ tˆn. Since sequences {κHt (∆n), pHt (∆n)}
satisfy (10) for all t ≤ tˆn, and since κ˜Ht (∆n) = κHt (∆n) for all t ≤ tˆn + ∆n, p˜Ht < pHt for all
t ≤ tˆn implies that sequences {κ˜Ht (∆n), p˜Ht (∆n)} satisfy (10).
Note that
κ˜Htˆn+∆n − p˜Htˆn = e−(r+λ)∆
n
(κ˜Htˆ+∆n − p˜Htˆn+∆n) + e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n))
> e−(r+λ)∆
n
(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pˆ(κ˜Htˆn+∆n)) + e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n))
= e−(r+λ)∆
n
ρ(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n)) + e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n))
= ρ(∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n)),
where the strict inequality uses p˜H
tˆn+∆n
= pˆ(κ˜H
tˆn+2∆n
) < pˆ(κ˜H
tˆn+∆n
), the second equality
uses pˆ(κ˜H
tˆn+∆n
) = κ˜H
tˆn+∆n
(1 − ρ(∆n)) + ρ(∆n)pL(κ˜H
tˆn+∆n
), and the last equality uses ρ(∆) =
e−r∆(1− e−λ∆) + ρe−(r+λ)∆. Since κ˜H
tˆn+∆n
(∆n) = κH
tˆn+∆n
(∆n), and since p
H
tˆn
(∆n) = pˆ(κn) =
pˆ(κH
tˆn+∆n
(∆n)), it follows that p˜H
tˆn
(∆n) < pH
tˆn
(∆n).
I now use this to show that p˜Ht (∆
n) < pHt (∆
n) for all t < tˆn. For all t ≤ tˆn, prices
30
{pHt (∆n)} satisfy
κHt+∆n(∆
n)− pHt (∆n) = e−(r+λ)∆
n
(κHt+∆n(∆
n)− pHt+∆n(∆n))
+ e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κHt+∆n(∆n)− pL(κHt+∆n(∆n))).
Combining this equation with (18), for all t < tˆn,
pHt (∆
n)− p˜Ht (∆n) = e−(r+λ)∆
n
(pHt+∆n(∆
n)− p˜Ht+∆n(∆n)),
where I used κ˜Ht (∆
n) = κHt (∆
n) for all t ≤ tˆn + ∆n. Since p˜Htˆn < pHtˆn , it follows that
pHt (∆
n) > p˜Ht (∆
n) for all t < tˆn. Hence, {κ˜Ht (∆n), p˜Ht (∆n)} satisfies (10).
I now show that, for n sufficiently large, {κ˜Ht (∆n), p˜Ht (∆n)} also satisfies (17). I start by
showing that p˜Ht (∆
n) > p˜Ht+∆n(∆
n) for all t < tˆn+∆
n, so prices p˜Ht (∆
n) are decreasing. This
implies that p˜Ht (∆
n) > p˜H
tˆn+∆n
(∆n) = pˆ(κˆn) for all t ≤ tˆn. Since pˆ(κˆn) = (1 − ρ(∆n))κˆn +
ρ(∆)pL(κˆn), κˆn > v
∗(∆n) = cH
1−ρ(∆n) , and p
L(κˆn) ≥ v, this further implies that pˆ(κˆn) −
cH > ρ(∆
n)v. Hence, if prices p˜Ht (∆
n) are decreasing, then p˜Ht (∆
n) − cH > ρ(∆n)v for all
t ≤ tˆn + ∆n.
Recall that
p˜Htˆn+∆n = pˆ(κ˜
H
tˆn+2∆n
(∆n)) = (1− ρ(∆n))κ˜Htˆn+2∆n(∆n) + ρ(∆n)pL(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n(∆n))
⇐⇒ κ˜Htˆn+2∆n − p˜Htˆn+∆n = ρ(∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n))
⇐⇒ κ˜Htˆn+2∆n − p˜Htˆn+∆n = e−(r+λ)∆
n
(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n − p˜Htˆn+∆n) + e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n)),
(19)
where the last line uses ρ(∆) = e
−r∆(1−e−λ∆)
1−e−(r+λ)∆ . Moreover, p˜
H
tˆn
satisfies (18), and so
κ˜Htˆn+∆n − p˜Htˆn = e−(r+λ)∆
n
(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − p˜Htˆn+∆n) + e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n))
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Combining this with (19) yields
p˜Htˆn − p˜Htˆn+∆n = (1− e−r∆
n
)(κ˜Htˆn+∆n − κ˜Htˆn+2∆n) + e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(pL(κ˜Htˆn+∆n)− pL(κ˜Htˆn+2∆n)) > 0,
where the strict inequality follows since κ˜H
tˆn+∆n
> κH
tˆn+2∆n
and pL(·) is weakly increasing.
Towards an induction, suppose that p˜Ht′ > p˜
H
t′+∆n for all t
′ = t + ∆n, ..., tˆn. I now show
that p˜Ht > p˜
H
t+∆n . Since p˜
H
t and p˜
H
t+∆n satisfy (18), it follows that
p˜Ht − p˜Ht+∆n = (1− e−r∆
n
)(κ˜Ht+∆n − κ˜Ht+2∆n) + e−(r+λ)∆
n
(p˜Ht+∆n − p˜Ht+2∆n)
+ e−r∆
n
(1− e−λ∆n)(pL(κ˜Ht+∆n)− pL(κ˜Ht+2∆n)) > 0.
By the Coase conjecture, for all κ, UL(κ) → v as ∆ → 0; i.e., the seller earns a profit
margin of v on each sale she makes when her costs are cL. Since the profit margin (p˜
H
t − cH)
that she earns on each sale when her cost is cH is larger than ρv, in the limit as n → ∞
the seller’s profits from selling when her costs are cH are larger than what she would get
by waiting until her costs fall to cL and then playing the continuation equilibrium. Hence,
constraint (17) is satisfied under sequences {p˜Ht (∆n), κ˜Ht (∆n)} when n is sufficiently large.
The arguments above show that, for n large enough, {κ˜Ht (∆n), p˜Ht (∆n)} satisfies all the
conditions in Theorem 1(ii). Hence, for n large enough, {κ˜Ht (∆n), p˜Ht (∆n)} can be supported
by an equilibrium in ΣS(∆n). But this contradicts the fact that, for all n, (σ∆
n
, µ∆
n
) is a
welfare maximizing equilibrium in ΣS(∆n) (recall that inefficiencies under {p˜Ht (∆n), κ˜Ht (∆n)}
are smaller than under {pHt (∆n), κHt (∆n)}). Therefore, κ(σ∆,µ∆)−v∗(∆)→ 0 as ∆→ 0. 
For all κ ∈ [v, v] and ∆ > 0, let UL(κ; ∆) be the seller’s continuation profits when her
cost is cL and her belief cutoff is κ. Define pi
L(κ; ∆) ≡ F (κ)UL(κ; ∆).
Lemma B.2 (no atoms). Fix a sequence {∆n} → 0. For each n, let (σ∆n , µ∆n) be a welfare
maximizing equilibrium in ΣS(∆n), and let {κHt (∆n), pHt (∆n)} be the sequences of prices and
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belief cutoffs induced by (σ∆
n
, µ∆
n
). There exists B > 0 such that, for all t ∈ T (∆n),
lim
n→∞
F (κHt (∆
n))− F (κHt+∆n(∆n))
∆n
≤ B.
Hence, for all t ∈ T (∆n), κHt (∆n)− κHt+∆n(∆n)→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Note first that, for all n, there exists tˆn such that
F (κHt (∆
n))−F (κHt+∆n (∆n))
∆n
= 0 for all
t > tˆn; i.e., tˆn is the last period at which the seller makes sells when costs are high.
Consider next t ≤ tˆn. By Lemma A.1, and using piL(κ; ∆) = F (κ)UL(κ; ∆),
(F (κHt (∆
n))− F (κHt+∆n(∆n)))pHt (∆n) ≤ piL(κHt (∆n); ∆n)(1− e−r∆
n
)
+ e−r∆
n
(piL(κHt (∆
n); ∆n)− piL(κHt+∆n(∆n); ∆n)).
(20)
Let pL(κ; ∆) be the price that a low cost seller would charge when her cutoff beliefs are
κ in a setting with time period ∆. Note that, since pL(κ; ∆) ∈ [v, pL(v; ∆)] for all κ,
piL(κHt (∆
n); ∆n)− piL(κHt+∆n(∆n); ∆n) ≤ pL(v; ∆n)(F (κHt (∆n))− F (κHt+∆n(∆n))).
Combining this with (20),
F (κHt (∆
n))− F (κHt+∆n(∆n))
∆n
(pHt (∆
n)−e−r∆npL(v; ∆n)) ≤ piL(κHt (∆n); ∆n)
1− e−r∆n
∆n
. (21)
Next, recall from the proof of Lemma B.1 that prices pHt (∆
n) are decreasing: for all t < tˆn,
pHt (∆
n) > pH
tˆn
(∆n) = pˆ(κ(σ
∆n ,µ∆
n
)) ≥ pˆ(v∗(∆n)) = (1−ρ(∆n))v∗(∆n)+ρ(∆n)pL(v∗(∆n); ∆n).
Since lim∆→0 ρ(∆) = λr+λ , lim∆→0 v
∗(∆) = r+λ
r
cH and lim∆→0 pL(v; ∆) = v, it follows that
lim
n→∞
pHt (∆
n)− e−r∆npL(v; ∆n) ≥ cH + λ
r + λ
v − v = cH − r
r + λ
v > 0.
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The strict inequality holds since, by Assumption 1, v∗(∆) ∈ (v, v), and so lim∆→0 v∗(∆) =
r+λ
r
cH > v.
Using this in inequality (21)
lim
n→∞
F (κHt (∆
n))− F (κHt+∆(∆n))
∆n
≤ lim
n→∞
1
pHt (∆
n)− e−r∆npL(v; ∆n)pi
L(κHt (∆
n); ∆n)
1− e−r∆n
∆n
≤ r + λ
(r + λ)cH − rv rv,
where the last inequality uses lim∆→0 piL(κ; ∆) = F (κ)v ≤ v. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Note first that, by (16), sequences {κHt (∆), pHt (∆)}t∈T (∆) are such
that, for all t < tˆ,
κHt+∆(∆)− pHt (∆) = e−(r+λ)∆(κHt+∆(∆)− pHt+∆(∆))
+ e−r∆(1− e−λ∆)(κHt+∆(∆)− pL(κHt+∆(∆); ∆)). (22)
For each t ∈ [0,∞), let pH(t) = lim∆→0 pHt (∆) and κH(t) = lim∆→0 κHt (∆) (if needed,
take a convergent subsequence, which exists by Helly’s Selection Theorem). Dividing both
sides of (22) by ∆ and rearranging,
pHt (∆)− pHt+∆(∆)
∆
= κHt+∆(∆)
(1− e−r∆)
∆
− pHt+∆(∆)
(1− e−(r+λ)∆)
∆
+ e−r∆
(1− e−λ∆)
∆
pL(κHt+∆(∆); ∆). (23)
Taking limits on both sides of (23) as ∆→ 0 and using lim∆→0 pL(κ,∆) = v and lim∆→0 κHt (∆)−
κHt+∆(∆) = 0 (Lemma B.2),
lim
∆→0
pHt (∆)− pHt+∆(∆)
∆
= −dp
H(t)
dt
= rκH(t)− (r + λ)pH(t) + λv.
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Under the most efficient equilibrium, it must be that inequality (10) holds with equality
for almost t ∈ T (∆). Using piL(κ; ∆) = F (κ)UL(κ; ∆),
pHt (∆)(F (κ
H
t (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))) = piL(κHt (∆); ∆)− piL(κHt+∆(∆); ∆)
+ (1− e−r∆)piL(κHt+∆(∆); ∆). (24)
Note next that, for all κ, κ′ ∈ [v, v] with κ > κ′, the following inequalities hold:
piL(κ; ∆)− piL(κ′; ∆) ≥ v(F (κ)− F (κ′))
piL(κ; ∆)− piL(κ′; ∆) ≤ pL(v; ∆)(F (κ)− F (κ′)).
The inequalities follow since, for all belief cutoffs κ˜, pL(κ˜; ∆) ∈ [v, pL(v; ∆)]. Combining
these inequalities with (24), and dividing through by ∆, yields
v
F (κHt (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))
∆
+
1− e−r∆
∆
piL(κHt+∆(∆); ∆)
≤pHt (∆)
F (κHt (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))
∆
≤pL(v; ∆)F (κ
H
t (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))
∆
+
1− e−r∆
∆
piL(κHt+∆(∆); ∆).
Taking the limit as ∆→ 0 and using lim∆→0 pL(v; ∆) = v and lim∆→0 piL(κ; ∆) = vF (κ),
lim
∆→0
pHt (∆)
F (κHt (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))
∆
= lim
∆→0
v
F (κHt (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))
∆
+ rvF (κH(t))
⇐⇒ lim
∆→0
F (κHt (∆))− F (κHt+∆(∆))
∆
= −dκ
H(t)
dt
f(κH(t)) =
rvF (κH(t))
pH(t)− v .
The boundary condition for κH(·) is κH(0) = v. To derive the boundary condition for
pH(·), let vˆ = lim∆→0 v∗(∆) = r+λr cH . By Lemma B.1, belief cutoffs κH(t) reaches vˆ = r+λr cH
at finite time tˆ = inf{t ≥ 0 : κH(t) = vˆ}. The price at which the seller sells to a buyer with
valuation vˆ must be such that this buyer is indifferent between buying now, or waiting until
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costs fall to cL and getting the good at price v. Hence, p
H(tˆ) = r
r+λ
vˆ+ λ
r+λ
v = cH+
λ
r+λ
v. 
C Proofs of Propositions 2, 4 and 5
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose first that the seller can commit to a mechanism at
time t = 0−, before learning her initial cost. For each v ∈ [v, v], let τ(v) ∈ R+ ∪{∞} denote
the random time at which a buyer with type v buys under this commitment solution, and
let p(v) denote the price at which consumer with value v buys.
The seller’s expected profits are
E
[∫ v
v
e−rτ(v)(p(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv
]
= E
[∫ v
v
e−rτ(v)(φ(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv
]
,
where E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to cost process {ct}, and where the equality
follows since, by incentive compatibility, E[e−rτ(v)p(v)] = E
[
e−rτ(v)v − ∫ v
v
e−rτ(x)dx
]
for all
v ∈ [v, v]. Note that, for each v, the solution to maxτ E[e−rτ (φ(v) − cτ )] is: τ = 0 if
φ(v) ≥ v∗(∆); τ = τL = inf{t : ct = cL = 0} if φ(v) ∈ [0, v∗(∆)]; and τ = ∞ if φ(v) < 0.
Hence, if the seller can commit before learning her initial cost, a buyer with φ(v) ≥ v∗(∆)
buys at time t = 0, a buyer with φ(v) ∈ [0, v∗(∆)] buys at time τ = τL = inf{t : ct = cL = 0},
and a buyer with φ(v) < 0 never buys. Let vH be such that φ(vH) = v
∗(∆) and let
vL = inf{v ∈ [v, v] : φ(v) ≥ 0}. This commitment solution can be implemented with the
following path of prices: the seller charges price pH = vH − ρ(∆)(vH − vL) while her cost is
cH , and charges price pL = vL when her cost reaches cL.
Suppose next that the seller can only commit to a mechanism after learning her initial
cost c0. Under a direct mechanism: at t = 0 the buyer reports her value v ∈ [v, v] and the
seller reports her initial cost c0 ∈ {cL, cH}; at any time t > 0, the seller reports her cost
ct ∈ {cL, cH} (or, equivalently, the seller reports the first time her cost falls to cL).
36
Consider the following direct mechanism. If the seller’s initial cost report is cL: (i) buyer
and seller trade immediately at price pL = vL if buyer reported v ≥ vL; (ii) if buyer reported
v < vL, she never trades, and pays nothing to the seller. If the seller’s initial cost report is
cH : (i) buyer and seller trade immediately at price pH if buyer reported v ≥ vH ; (ii) if buyer
reported v ∈ [vL, vH ], she pays ρ(∆)vL to the seller at time t = 0, and then gets the good
the first time the seller reports that her cost fell to cL = 0, at additional price cL = 0; (iii)
if buyer reported v < vL, she never trades, and pays nothing to the seller.
Note that, conditional on truth-telling, this mechanism gives the same expected payoff
to all buyer types than the commitment solution discussed above; and hence it is incentive
compatible for the buyer to report truthfully, conditional on the seller reporting truthfully.
Moreover, it also gives the same expected revenues to the seller. I now show that it is
incentive compatible for the seller to report truthfully. To see why, note first that a seller
with c0 = cH does not find it profitable to mimic a seller with c0 = cL. Moreover, a seller
who reported c0 = cH finds it weakly optimal to report her cost ct truthfully for all t > 0.
A seller with c0 = cL earns profits vL(1 − F (vL)) by reporting truthfully at t = 0.
Note that, since vL = inf{v ∈ [v, v] : φ(v) ≥ 0} and since φ(v) is strictly increasing,
vL = arg maxv v(1− F (v)). If a seller with c0 = cL reports cost cH at t = 0, her profits are
pH(1− F (vH)) + ρ(∆)vL(F (vH)− F (vL)) = vH(1− ρ(∆))(1− F (vH)) + ρ(∆)vL(1− F (vL)),
where I used pH = (1− ρ(∆))vH + ρ(∆)vL. Note that
vL(1− F (vL))− (vH(1− ρ(∆))(1− F (vH)) + ρ(∆)vL(1− F (vL)))
=(1− ρ(∆))(vL(1− F (vL))− vH(1− F (vH)) ≥ 0,
where the inequality uses vL = arg maxv v(1−F (v)). Hence, a seller with initial cost cL finds
it optimal to report truthfully at t = 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. I start by showing that κ − P (κ) > λ
r+λ
(κ − v) for all κ > vˆ.
Since P (κH(t)) = pH(t) for all t ≤ tˆ, this is equivalent to showing that κH(t) − pH(t) >
λ
r+λ
(κH(t)− v) for all t < tˆ, or that
∀t < tˆ, D(t) ≡ r(κH(t)− pH(t)) + λ(v − pH(t)) > 0.
Using equation (4),
D′(t) = r
dκH(t)
dt
− (r + λ)dp
H(t)
dt
= r
dκH(t)
dt
+ (r + λ)[r(κH(t)− pH(t)) + λ(v − pH(t))]
= r
dκH(t)
dt
+ (r + λ)D(t). (25)
Note that pH(tˆ) = vˆ − λ
r+λ
(vˆ − v) = κH(tˆ) − λ
r+λ
(κH(tˆ) − v), and so D(tˆ) = 0. Since
dκH(t)
dt
< 0 for all t ≤ tˆ, it follows that D′(tˆ) < 0. Hence, D(t) > 0 for all t < tˆ close to tˆ.
Let t˜ = inf{t < tˆ : D(t) > 0}. Towards a contradiction, suppose that t˜ > 0. Since D(t) is
continuous, D(t˜) = 0. Moreover, since D(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (t˜, tˆ), it must be that D′(t˜) ≥ 0.
Using (25), and noting that dκ
H(t)
dt
|t=t˜ < 0 and D(t˜) = 0,
D′(t˜) = r
dκH(t)
dt
|t=t˜ + (r + λ)D(t˜) < 0,
a contradiction. Hence, D(t) > 0 for all t < tˆ. And so κ− P (κ) > λ
r+λ
(κ− v) for all κ > vˆ.
I now show part (i). For each cH , let vˆ(cH) =
λ+r
r
cH be the efficient cutoff for cost cH ,
and let PH(κ; cH) denote the solution to (7) and boundary condition for cost cH .
Fix c′H > cH , so vˆ(c
′
H) > vˆ(cH). Note that vˆ(cH) − PH(vˆ(cH); cH) = λr+λ(vˆ(cH) −
v). By the arguments above, κ − P (κ; cH) > λr+λ(κ − v) for all κ > vˆ(cH); in particular,
vˆ(c′H) − PH(vˆ(c′H); cH) > λr+λ(vˆ(c′H) − v) = vˆ(c′H) − P (vˆ(c′H); c′H), and so PH(vˆ(c′H); c′H) >
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PH(vˆ(c′H); cH).
I now show that PH(κ; c′H) > P
H(κ; cH) for all κ ∈ [vˆ(c′H), v]. Towards a contradiction,
suppose the result is not true, and let κ˜ = inf{κ ∈ [vˆ(c′H), v] : PH(κ; c′H) ≤ PH(κ; cH)}.
Since PH(κ; c′H) and P
H(κ; cH) are continuous and since P
H(vˆ(c′H); c
′
H) > P
H(vˆ(c′H); cH), it
must be that κ˜ > vˆ(c′H) and P
H(κ˜; c′H) = P
H(κ˜; cH). But then, P
H(·; c′H) and PH(·; cH) both
solve ODE (7), with PH(κ˜; c′H) = P
H(κ˜; cH); and so P
H(·; c′H) = PH(·; cH), a contradiction.
Hence, PH(κ; c′H) > P
H(κ; cH) for all κ ∈ [vˆ(c′H), v]. Finally, by equation (5), the speed of
trade falls when prices pH(t) = PH(κH(t)) increase.
I now turn to part (ii). Fix distributions F1 and F0 such that F1 dominates F0 in terms
of the reverse hazard-rate. Let PH(κ;Fi) denote the solution to (7) and boundary condition
under distribution Fi.
I start by showing that PH(κ;F1) > P
H(κ;F0) for all κ > vˆ. Note first that P
H(vˆ;Fi) =
cH +
λ
r+λ
v = vˆ − λ
r+λ
(vˆ − v) for i = 0, 1. Using (7), for i = 0, 1,
dPH(κ;Fi)
dκ
|κ=vˆ = 0,
d2PH(κ;Fi)
dκ2
|κ=vˆ = r fi(vˆ)
Fi(vˆ)
PH(vˆ)− v
rv
.
Since f1(v)
F1(v)
> f0(v)
F0(v)
for all v, d
2PH(κ;F1)
dκ2
|κ=vˆ > d2PH(κ;F0)dκ2 |κ=vˆ. Hence, there exists v˜ > vˆ such
that PH(κ;F1) > P
H(κ;F0) for all κ ∈ (vˆ, v˜).
Towards a contradiction, suppose that the result is not true, and let κ˜ = inf{κ >
vˆ : PH(κ;F1) ≤ PH(κ;F0)}. Since PH(κ;F1) and PH(κ;F0) are continuous, PH(κ˜;F1) =
PH(κ˜;F0). Since P
H(κ;F1) > P
H(κ;F0) for all κ ∈ (vˆ, κ˜), it must be that dPH(κ;F1)dκ |κ=κ˜ ≤
dPH(κ;F0)
dκ
|κ=κ˜. But PH(κ˜;F1) = PH(κ˜;F0) and f1(κ˜)F1(κ˜) >
f0(κ˜)
F0(κ˜)
, together with ODE (7) im-
plies dP
H(κ;F1)
dκ
|κ=κ˜ > dPH(κ;F0)dκ |κ=κ˜, a contradiction. Therefore, PH(κ;F1) > PH(κ;F0) for all
κ > vˆ. Lastly, since prices are higher under F1 than under F0, by equation (6) the rate at
which the seller makes sells is slower under F1 than under F0.
I now turn to part (iii). For each λ, let vˆ(λ) = λ+r
r
cH , and let P
H(κ;λ) denote the
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solution to (7) and boundary condition for λ. Note that dP
H(κ;λ)
dκ
|κ=vˆ(λ)= 0. Note further
that
∂
∂λ
PH(vˆ(λ);λ) =
∂
∂λ
(
cH +
λ
r + λ
v
)
=
r
(λ+ r)2
v > 0.
Hence, for all λ′ > λ close enough to λ, it must that PH(vˆ(λ′);λ′) > PH(vˆ(λ′);λ). Since
PH(·;λ′) and PH(·;λ) are continuous, there exists κ˜ > vˆ(λ′) such that PH(κ;λ′) > PH(κ;λ)
for all κ ∈ (vˆ(λ′), κ˜). Next, note that by equation (5), the speed of trade falls when prices
pH(t) = PH(κH(t)) increase. Hence, for all t with κH(t) ∈ (vˆ(λ′), κ˜), the speed of trade is
lower under λ′. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Part (i) follows from equation (6) and the fact that, for all t ≤ tˆ,
pH(t) ≥ pH(tˆ) = cH + λr+λv > v (since, by Assumption 1, v < vˆ = r+λr cH). For part (ii), note
that in the limit as v → 0 the seller only trades with the buyer once costs are cL, at price v.
Hence, seller’s profits go to zero as v → 0. Since all types of buyers trade at time τL in the
limit as v → 0, the total equilibrium surplus converges to (q λ
r+λ
+ 1 − q)E[v], establishing
part (iii) (recall that q = prob(c0 = cH)). 
D Proof of Proposition 6
I start with some preliminary observations. Note that, in any equilibrium (σ∆, µ∆) ∈ Σpub(∆)
of the game with public costs, when the seller’s costs fall to cL the continuation equilibrium
is the same as in the game in which it is common knowledge that the seller’s costs are cL.
This observation implies that Lemma A.2 continues to hold when costs are public. In
particular, in any (σ∆, µ∆) ∈ Σpub(∆), the seller sells with probability zero at any period t
with ct = cH and κt ≤ v∗(∆). The reason for this twofold. First, in any (σ∆, µ∆) ∈ Σpub(∆)
and for any cutoff beliefs κ, the seller’s profits when costs are cH cannot be lower than ρpi
L(κ),
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since the seller can wait until costs fall to cL and then play the continuation equilibrium.
Second, price pHt at which a buyer with valuation κ
H
t+∆ buys when costs are high must be
such that κHt+∆ − pHt ≥ ρ(κHt+∆ − pL(κHt+∆)). Indeed, a buyer with valuation κHt+∆ can get a
payoff at least as large as ρ(κHt+∆ − pL(κHt+∆)) by waiting until costs fall to cL and buying
at that time. With these two observations, the proof of Lemma A.2 goes through as is. I
summarize this discussion in the following Lemma.
Lemma D.1. Fix a PBE (σ, µ) ∈ Σpub(∆), and consider a period t with belief cutoff κt. If
ct = cH , then κt+∆ ≥ min{v∗(∆), κt}. In particular, if κt ≤ v∗(∆) and ct = cH , the seller
makes a sale with probability zero at time t.
For each ∆ > 0, let (σ∆, µ∆) ∈ Σpub(∆). For any on-path belief cutoff κ, let pH(κ; ∆)
denote the price that the seller charges under (σ∆, µ∆) when costs are cH and the seller’s
belief cutoff is κ. Let UH(κ; ∆) denote the seller’s continuation profits under (σ∆, µ∆) when
costs are cH and the seller’s belief cutoff is κ. Lastly, let {κHt (∆), pHt (∆)}t∈T (∆) denote the
sequence of belief cutoffs and prices induced by (σ∆, µ∆) on the equilibrium path when the
seller’s costs are cH .
Lemma D.2 (Efficiency). As ∆→ 0, the equilibrium outcome of (σ∆, µ∆) converges to the
efficient outcome: for all t > 0, lim∆→0 κHt (∆) = vˆ.
Proof. The proof adapts arguments in Liu (2015) to the current setting. Consider a period
t with belief cutoff κHt (∆) and with ct = cH . For each v ∈ [v, κHt (∆)], let τ∆(v) denote
the random time at which a buyer with valuation v buys. The seller’s continuation profits
UH(κHt (∆); ∆) at this history satisfies:
F (κHt (∆))U
H(κHt (∆); ∆) = E
[∫ κHt (∆)
v
e−rτ
∆(v)(φκHt (∆)(v)− cτ∆(v))f(v)dv|ct = cH
]
,
where E[·|ct = cH ] is the expectation over future cost realizations, and where for each κ
and v ≤ κ, φκ(v) = v − F (κ)−F (v)f(v) is the virtual valuation of a buyer with type v under
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truncated distribution F (v)
F (κ)
. The reason why this expression holds is that, at any PBE,
incentive compatibility must hold at every history. Note that, for every s ∈ T (∆), s > t,
F (κHt (∆))U
H(κHt (∆); ∆) ≥
∫ κHt (∆)
κHs (∆)
(φκHt (∆)(v)− cH)f(v)dv
+ e−r∆E
[∫ κHs (∆)
v
e−r(τ
∆(v)−s)(φκHt (∆)(v)− cτ∆(v))f(v)dv |ct = cH
]
(26)
Indeed, the right-hand side of (26) is the profits that the seller would obtain if she accel-
erated trade and sold to all buyer types v ∈ [κHs (∆), κHt (∆)] at time t and then played the
continuation equilibrium.22
By Helly’s Selection Theorem, there exists a sequence ∆n → 0 and functions κHt , pHt and
τ(v) such that, as n→∞, κHt (∆n) and pHt (∆n) converge pointwise to κHt and pHt , and τ∆n(v)
converges pointwise to τ(v). By Lemma D.1, κHt ≥ lim∆→0 v∗(∆) = vˆ for all t ≥ 0. Since
κHt is decreasing in t, to establish the result it suffices to show that κ
H
0+ = limt↘0 κ
H
t = vˆ.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that the result is not true, so κH0+ > vˆ. Let κ
H
sn be an
increasing sequence converging to κH0+ . By dominated convergence, and using (26), for all sn
it must be that
E
[∫ κH
0+
v
e−rτ(v)(φκH
0+
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv|c0+ = cH
]
≥
∫ κH
0+
κHsn
(φκH
0+
(v)− cH)f(v)dv + E
[∫ κHsn
v
e−r(τ(v)−sn)(φκH
0+
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cH
]
.
(27)
Since κHsn ↗ κH0+ > vˆ, for all n large enough we have that φκH0+ (v) = v −
F (κH
0+
)−F (v)
f(v)
> vˆ for
all v ∈ [κHsn , κH0+ ]. It follows that, for all n large, for all v ∈ [κHsn , κH0+ ] and for all random times
22By stationarity of the equilibrium, such a deviation does not affect the prices that the different types
of buyers are willing to accept.
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τ > 0, φκH
0+
(v)− cH > E[e−rτ (φκH
0+
(v)− cτ )|c0 = cH ].23 Since the seller’s continuation payoff
E
[∫ κHsn
v
e−rτ(v)(φκH
0+
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cH
]
at state κHsn is non-negative,
24 it follows that
for all n large enough
∫ κH
0+
κHsn
(φκH
0+
(v)− cH)f(v)dv + E
[∫ κHsn
v
e−r(τ(v)−sn)(φκH
0+
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cH
]
>E
[∫ κH
0+
v
e−rτ(v)(φκH
0+
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv|c0+ = cH
]
,
which violates (27). 
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) follows from Lemmas D.1 and D.2, together with the
fact that, when c0 = cL = 0, by the Coase conjecture all buyers buy immediately in the limit
as ∆→ 0.
For every ∆, let κH(∆) be such that {κHt (∆)} converges to κH(∆) as t → ∞. That is,
κH(∆) is the lowest valuation at which the buyer buys when the seller’s costs are cH and the
time period is ∆. The price p at which the seller sells to a buyer with valuation κH(∆) when
her cost is cH must be such that κ
H(∆)−p = ρ(∆)(κH(∆)−pL(κH(∆)))⇐⇒ p = pˆ(κH(∆)).
By Lemma D.2, κH(∆)→ vˆ = r+λ
r
cH as ∆→ 0. Since pL(κ)→ v for all κ as ∆→ 0, it
follows that lim∆→0 pˆ(κH(∆)) → rvˆ+λvr+λ = cH + λr+λv. Therefore, when c0 = cH the limiting
initial price is cH +
λ
r+λ
v, establishing part (ii).
The limiting profits that the seller makes when c0 = cH are then
lim
∆→0
Upub(σ∆, µ∆; ∆) = (1− F (vˆ))
(
cH +
λ
r + λ
v − cH
)
+ F (vˆ)
λ
r + λ
v =
λ
r + λ
v,
establishing part (iii). 
23Indeed, for all v with φκ(v) > vˆ, the solution to supτ E[e−rτ (φκ(v)− cτ )|c0 = cH ] is τ = 0.
24The seller’s continuation payoff 1
F (κHsn )
E
[∫ κHsn
v
e−rτ(v)(φκH
0+
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cH
]
is bounded be-
low by λr+λv > 0, which is the payoff from waiting until costs fall to cL = 0 and posting price v.
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E Mechanism design: efficient mechanisms and ineffi-
cient equilibria
This Appendix has two results. First, it shows that, under certain conditions, there exists
a direct mechanism satisfying IC, IR, and BB that attains the efficient outcome. Second, it
shows that all PBE of the game are inefficient.
Consider the following direct mechanism, which I denote MFB. At t = 0, buyer reports
her type v ∈ [v, v] and seller reports her initial cost c0 ∈ {cL, cH}. If the seller reports
c0 = cL = 0, then all types of buyers trade at t = 0 and pay price v > 0 to the seller.
If the seller instead reports c0 = cH , then at t = 0: (i) all buyer types with v ∈ [v∗(∆), v]
trade at t = 0 and pay price cH + ρ(∆)v; (ii) all buyer types with v ∈ [v, v∗(∆)) pay the
seller a price ρ(∆)v but don’t trade yet. Then, at each period t ∈ T (∆), t > 0, the seller
reports her cost ct ∈ {cL, cH}. If at t > 0 the seller reports ct = cH , nothing happens. The
first period t > 0 at which the seller reports ct = cL, all buyer types v ∈ [v, v∗(∆)) trade,
and pay price cL(= 0) to the seller at this point.
Proposition E.1. Suppose that (1 − ρ(∆))v ≥ (1 − F (v∗(∆)))cH . Then, mechanism MFB
is budget balance, satisfies IC and IR, and implements the first best outcome.
Proof. It is easy to check that this mechanism: (a) is budget balance, (b) satisfies IC for the
buyer, (c) satisfies IR for buyer and seller, and (d) implements the efficient outcome under
truthful reporting. I now show that the mechanism also satisfies IC for the seller. Consider
first a seller who reported c0 = cH at t = 0. Then, for all t > 0, the seller strictly prefers to
report ct = cH if her current cost is cH , while she is indifferent between reporting cL or cH
if her cost is cL. Hence, truthful reporting is (weakly) optimal.
Consider next time t = 0. A seller with initial cost cH obtains a payoff of ρ(∆)v from
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reporting truthfully, and gets a payoff of v − cH from reporting c0 = cL. Recall than
v∗(∆) = cH
1−ρ(∆) > v, where the inequality follows from Assumption 1. Hence, ρ(∆)v > v−cH ,
so a seller with initial cost cH strictly prefers to report truthfully.
A seller with initial cost cL gets a payoff of v if she reports truthfully. Her payoff from
reporting c0 = cH is (1− F (v∗(∆)))(cH + ρ(∆)v) + F (v∗(∆))ρ(∆)v. Reporting truthfully is
optimal when (1− ρ(∆))v ≥ (1− F (v∗(∆)))cH . 
I now show that every PBE of the game, or any limiting PBE as ∆ → 0, is inefficient.
Note that any (σ, µ) ∈ Σ(∆) (or any limit of equilibria (σn, µn) ∈ Σ(∆n) with ∆n → 0)
induces an outcome τ : [v, v]× {cL, cH} → R+ and p : [v, v]× {cL, cH} → R+, where τ(v, c0)
(resp. p(v, c0)) is the possibly random time (resp. expected price) at which a buyer with
value v buys when the seller’s initial cost is c0.
Since the seller is making all the offers, prices p(v, c0) must satisfy p(v, c0) ≥ v for all
v ∈ [v, v] and c0 ∈ {cL, cH}: in any PBE, all buyer types accept a price v with probability
1.25 This implies that, in any PBE, the profits of a seller with initial cost cH are bounded
below by ρv. Indeed, a seller with initial cost cH can wait until her cost falls to cL, charge
price v, and make a sale with probability 1, earning ρv.
Recall that the first-best outcome τFB : [v, v]×{cL, cH} → R+ has τFB(v, cL) = 0 for all
v, and τFB(v, cH) = 1v<v∗τL + 1v≥v∗ , where τL = inf{t : ct = cL}.
Proposition E.2. Let τ : [v, v] × {cL, cH} → R+ and p : [v, v] × {cL, cH} → R+ be an
outcome induced by a PBE (σ, µ) ∈ Σ(∆), or the limiting outcome induced by a sequence of
PBE (σn, µn) ∈ Σ(∆n) with ∆n → 0. Then, τ 6= τFB.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the result is not true, so τ = τFB. Let U(v) be the
utility that a buyer with type v gets under this outcome:
U(v) = E[qe−rτFB(v,cH)(v − p(v, cH)) + (1− q)e−rτFB(v,cL)(v − p(v, cL))].
25This follows from arguments in Lemma 1 in Gul et al. (1985), or Lemma S10 in Ortner (2017).
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By incentive compatibility, U(v) satisfies:
U(v) = U(v) +
∫ v
v
E[qe−rτFB(x,cH) + (1− q)e−rτFB(x,cL)]dx (28)
for all v ∈ [v, v]. Since p(v, c) ≥ v for all v, U(v) = 0.
Consider first v < v∗, and note that
U(v) = qρ(v − p(v, cH)) + (1− q)(v − p(v, cL))
= qρ(v − v) + (1− q)(v − v), (29)
where the first equality uses the properties of τFB(v, c0) and the second follows from equation
(28), using U(v) = 0. Since p(v, c0) ≥ v for c0 ∈ {cL, cH} and for all v, equation (29) implies
p(v, cL) = p(v, cH) = v for all v.
Consider next v ≥ v∗, and note that
U(v) = q(v − p(v, cH)) + (1− q)(v − p(v, cL))
= q[ρ(v∗ − v) + (v − v∗)] + (1− q)(v − v), (30)
where again the first equality uses the properties of τFB(v, c0) and the second follows from
equation (28), using U(v) = 0. Equation (30) implies that, for all v ≥ v∗,
qp(v, cH) + (1− q)p(v, cL) = q[v∗ − ρ(v∗ − v)] + (1− q)v = q(cH + ρv) + (1− q)v,
where the last equality uses v∗ − cH = ρv∗. Since p(v, cL) ≥ v for all v, it follows that
p(v, cH) ≤ cH + ρv. I now show that p(v, cL) = v and p(v, cH) = cH + ρv for almost
all v ≥ v∗. Suppose not, so there exists a positive measure of buyer types v ≥ v∗ with
p(v, cH) < cH + ρv. Since p(v, cH) = v for all v < v
∗, the profits of seller with c0 = cH under
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outcome τ, p are
(1− F (v∗))E[p(v, cH)− cH |v ≥ v∗] + F (v∗)ρv < ρv.
But this cannot be, since a seller with c0 = cH can obtain ρv by waiting until her costs fall
to cL and charging price v. Hence, p(v, cH) = cH + ρv and p(v, cL) = v for almost all v ≥ v∗.
By the arguments above, under outcome (τ, p) a seller with c0 = cL earns profits v. The
profits that this seller can obtain by mimicking a seller with c0 = cH , and then playing as if
her cost fell to cL at time s∆ are (1−F (v∗))(cH +ρv) + e−rs∆F (v∗)v, which is strictly larger
than v for all s∆ small enough, a contradiction. Hence, τ 6= τFB. 
F Increasing costs
This appendix studies a version of the model in which the evolution of {ct} satisfies prob(ct+∆ =
cH |ct = cH) = e−λ∆ and prob(ct+∆ = cL|ct = cL) = e−γ∆.
Recall that v∗ is such that v∗ − cH = ρv∗, where ρ is defined as in the main text. Note
first that Proposition 1 continues to hold in this setting: under the first-best solution, the
seller sells to a buyer with value v ≥ v∗ at t = 0, and sells to a buyer with value v < v∗ the
first time her cost falls to cL. I maintain Assumption 1, so v
∗ ∈ (v, v).
I focus on PBE (σ, µ) that satisfy the following conditions. First, as in the main
text, I restrict attention to separating equilibria: for all histories hSt , suppσ
B(hSt )(cH) ∩
suppσB(hSt )(cL) = ∅. Second, I consider weakly stationary equilibria; i.e., equilibria in
which the buyer’s purchasing decision depends solely on her value and her beliefs about the
seller’s costs, and in which along the path of play, the seller’s strategy depends solely on her
current cost and her belief cutoff. With a slight abuse of notation, I let ΣS denote the set of
PBE satisfying these conditions.
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For each PBE (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS, let UH(σ,µ)(κ) and UL(σ,µ)(κ) denote, respectively, the seller’s
profits under (σ, µ) when her belief cutoff is κ and her cost is cH and cL. The following result
generalizes Lemma A.1 to the current environment:
Lemma F.1. Consider a seller history hSt such that the seller’s belief cutoff κt at time t is
strictly larger than v. Let pHt be the price that the seller charges under (σ, µ) ∈ ΣS at history
hSt if ct = cH , and let κt+∆ be the highest consumer type that buys at time t when ct = cH .
Then, κt and κt+∆ satisfy
pHt
F (κt)− F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
≤ UL(σ,µ)(κt)− e−(r+γ)∆
F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
UL(σ,µ)(κt+∆)
− e−r∆(1− e−γ∆)F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
UH(σ,µ)(κt+∆). (31)
Proof. Consider a seller whose cost changed from cH to cL at time t, after history h
S
t . The
profits that this seller obtains by revealing her cost are UL(σ,µ)(κt). The profits that this seller
would make by posting price pHt that she would have posted if ct = cH , and then from t+ ∆
onwards playing the continuation strategy with belief cutoff κt+∆ are
pHt
F (κt)− F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
+ e−(r+γ)∆
F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
UL(σ,µ)(κt+∆) + e
−r∆(1− e−γ∆)F (κt+∆)
F (κt)
UH(σ,µ)(κt+∆).
A seller whose cost changed to cL at period t has an incentive to reveal her cost only if (31)
holds. 
For each ∆ > 0, let (σ∆, µ∆) be an equilibrium in ΣS in a game with time-period ∆. For
each ∆ > 0 and each t ∈ T (∆), let κt(∆) denote the (random) sequence of belief cutoffs
under (σ∆, µ∆) at time t.26 Let pL(κ; ∆) and pH(κ; ∆) be the price that the seller offers
under (σ∆, µ∆) when costs are cL and cH , respectively, and her belief cutoff is κ.
26Note that κt(∆) is random even if the seller uses a pure strategy, since behavior until time t might
depend on past cost realizations.
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The next result shows that, in any equilibrium in ΣS, as ∆ → 0 buyer and seller trade
efficiently fast whenever the seller’s cost are cL. Let τ
∆
L denote the first time in T (∆) that
the seller’s costs are cL,
Lemma F.2. For all t > τ∆L , lim∆→0 κt(∆) = v.
Proof. Consider period τ∆L with belief cutoff κτ∆L = κ and with ct = cL. For each v ∈ [v, κ],
let τ∆(v) denote the random time at which a buyer with valuation v buys. The seller’s
continuation profits UL(κ; ∆) at this history satisfy:
F (κ)UL(κ; ∆) = E
[∫ κHt (∆)
v
e−rτ
∆(v)(φκ(v)− cτ∆(v))f(v)dv|ct = cL
]
,
where E[·|ct = cH ] is the expectation over future cost realizations, and where for each κ and
v ≤ κ, φκ(v) = v− F (κ)−F (v)f(v) is the virtual valuation of a buyer with type v under truncated
distribution F (v)
F (κ)
. This expression holds since incentive compatibility must hold at every
history.
For every s ∈ T (∆), s > τ∆L , let κLs (∆) denote the seller’s belief cutoff at time s under
(σ∆, µ∆), conditional on cτ = cL for all τ ∈ [τ∆L , s]. Let pL(κLs (∆),∆) be the price that the
seller charges at time s under (σ∆, µ∆) conditional on cτ = cL for all τ ∈ [τ∆L , s].
For all such s ∈ T (∆), s > τ∆L , it must be that
F (κ)UL(κ; ∆) ≥
∫ κ
κLs (∆)
(φκ(v)− cL)f(v)dv
+ e−r∆E
[∫ κLs (∆)
v
e−r(τ
∆(v)−s)(φκ(v)− cτ∆(v))f(v)dv |ct = cL
]
(32)
Indeed, the right-hand side of (33) is the profits that the seller would obtain if she accelerated
trade and sold to all buyer types v ∈ [κs(∆), κ] at time t and then played the continuation
equilibrium.27
27By stationarity of the equilibrium, such a deviation does not affect the prices that the different types
of buyers are willing to accept.
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By Helly’s Selection Theorem, there exists a sequence ∆n → 0 and functions κLt , pLt and
τ(v) such that, as n→∞, κLt (∆n) and pLt (∆n) converge pointwise to κLt and pLt , and τ∆n(v)
converges pointwise to τ(v). Since κLt is decreasing in t, to establish the result it suffices to
show that κH
τ+L
= lims↘0 κHτL+s = v.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that the result is not true, so κL
τ+L
> v. Let κLsn be an
increasing sequence converging to κL
τ+L
. By dominated convergence, and using (33), for all sn
it must be that
E
[∫ κL
τ+
L
v
e−rτ(v)(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv|c0+ = cL
]
≥
∫ κL
τ+
L
κHsn
(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cL)f(v)dv + E
[∫ κHsn
v
e−r(τ(v)−sn)(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cL
]
.
(33)
Since κLsn ↗ κLτ+L > v, for all n large enough we have that φκLτ+
L
(v) = v −
F (κL
τ+
L
)−F (v)
f(v)
>
v > cL = 0 for all v ∈ [κLsn , κLτ+L ]. It follows that, for all n large, for all v ∈ [κ
L
sn , κ
L
τ+L
] and
for all random times τ > 0, φκL
τ+
L
(v) − cL > E[e−rτ (φκL
τ+
L
(v) − cτ )|c0 = cL].28 Since the
seller’s continuation payoff E
[∫ κLsn
v
e−rτ(v)(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cL
]
at state κLsn is
non-negative, it follows that for all n large enough
∫ κL
τ+
L
κLsn
(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cH)f(v)dv + E
[∫ κHsn
v
e−r(τ(v)−sn)(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv |c0+ = cL
]
>E
[∫ κL
τ+
L
v
e−rτ(v)(φκL
τ+
L
(v)− cτ(v))f(v)dv|c0+ = cL
]
,
which violates (34). 
The following result follows from Lemma F.2.
28Indeed, for all v with φκ(v) > cL, the solution to supτ E[e−rτ (φκ(v)− cτ )|c0 = cL] is τ = 0.
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Corollary F.1. For any κ ∈ [v, v], pL(κ; ∆)→ v and UL(κ; ∆)→ v as ∆→ 0.
Using arguments similar to those in the proof of Theorem 2, one can show that in the
limit as ∆ → 0, under a most efficient separating equilibrium, the evolution of prices when
costs are cH still satisfies equation (4). Moreover, the limiting speed of trade now satisfies:
−dκ
H(t)
dt
=
F (κH(t))
f(κH(t))
(r + γ)v − γUH(κH(t))
(pH(t)− v) ,
where UH(κH(t)) is the limiting payoff of a seller with cost cH and belief cutoff κ
H(t).
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